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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is a participant observer case study that examined how three primary 
intervening variables (resources, trust, and risk communication) influenced the 
amplification and attenuation of perceived risk during a regulatory permitting process. 
The objective was to better understand the role of risk perception in a water policy 
decision, the issuance of a permit by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 
to the Waco Metropolitan Regional Sewerage System permitting them to discharge 1.5 
million gallons of waste water effluent a day into Bull Hide Creek. The study took place 
between March 2008 and October 2009. 
The plant, designed to serve the sewer needs of distant cities, was planned 
without the participation of the residents of the creek community. After being notified of 
the permit application, they organized to protest the issuance of the permit which they 
felt presented a serious risk to their community. It is the conclusion of this researcher 
that risk perception played a key role delaying the issuance of the permit and 
construction of the plant. When perceived risk attenuated to a mutually acceptable level 
for all stakeholders, the permit was issued.  
It is postulated that if risk perception is recognized as a significant factor in 
potentially controversial urban and regional planning and policy decisions, 
implementation may be less difficult. The validity of this conclusion is constrained due 
to the fact this was a single case study and generalization is limited. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
BHCCWA Bull Hide Creek Clearwater Alliance 
CAFO Confined Animal Feeding Operation 
EPA The United States Environmental Protection Agency 
ETJ Extra-territorial jurisdiction 
LULU Locally Unwanted Land Use 
NIMBY Not In My Back Yard 
NPDES National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
RFP Request for Proposal 
SARF Social Amplification of Risk Framework 
SOAH State Office of Administrative Hearings 
TBLLs  Technically Based Local Limits  
TCEQ Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 
TPDES Texas Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
WMARSS Waco Metropolitan Area Regional Sewerage System 
WWTP Wastewater Treatment Plant 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF PERCEIVED RISK IN WATER POLICY AND 
PLANNING 
 
“Perception is an interesting phenomenon that changes no facts but all meaning.” 
Jonathan Ellis 
 
Urban and regional planners are continually faced with difficult decisions related 
to controversial public policies associated with water use. These challenges are complex, 
dynamic, highly temporal, often geospatial, inevitably political, and profoundly 
economic. Frequently, these policies are controversial because they are perceived as 
risky, hazardous, economically unsound, socially undesirable, or environmentally 
disastrous by one or more stakeholders. Other stakeholders may believe the policies are 
equitable, sustainable, necessary, and encourage economic development. The challenges 
posed by these conflicts must be met to address future public needs, yet this process is 
often difficult as it requires integrating uncertainty, social constructs, public policy, 
budget constraints, and law. Private rights must be balanced with societal needs and 
institutional requirements while political power must be recognized.  
Involved parties may use objective quantitative analysis and scientific data to 
support, or undermine, proposed projects, but a positive, quantitative cost-benefit 
analysis is often overruled by emotional responses fueled by perceived risks to home, 
health, property, community, and family. It, therefore, is hypothesized that the primary 
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source of conflict associated with policy development and implementation is not 
objective risk but perceived risk. 
This thesis examines a policy decision to build a wastewater treatment plant 
designed to accommodate the projected sewer needs of a rapidly expanding suburban 
population. It is presented within a perceived risk framework comprised of three 
variables: trust, risk communication, and resources based on the Social Amplification of 
Risk Framework developed by Roger Kasperson, Ortwin Renn, Paul Slovic, Halina 
Brown, Jacque Emel, Robert Goble, Jeanne Kasperson and Samuel Ratick (Kasperson et 
al., 1988). It is hoped that this hypothesis-oriented, ethnographic study by a participant 
observer will result in a greater understanding of the role of risk perception in water 
policy and planning. 
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2. BACKGROUND: GENERAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH WATER PLANNING 
AND WASTEWATER PROCESSING 
 
As the world’s population continues to grow, competition for water resources has 
increased accordingly (Fox, 2011; Kultgen, 1975; Ramana, 2011). Historical disputes 
over the use of ground water and in-stream flows may be manifestations of perceived 
risk involving distribution, availability, allocation, quantity and quality (Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality, 2009). Necessary for human life, public health, 
ecosystem stability, manufacturing, food production, the generation of power, and social 
stability; water is a finite, high-value resource that is highly valued by both the public 
and private sectors. Because of its critical nature, philosophers, politicians, planners, 
concerned citizens, and economists debate whether access to water should be 
categorized as a basic human right, a critical human need, or a commodity to be 
privatized and traded on a free market. 
Not only is water for human consumption purposes becoming scarcer, what is 
available is often contaminated as a result of human activity. Contaminated watersheds 
and waterways result from mining, confined animal feeding operations (CAFO’s), 
agricultural activities, industrial activity, altered hydrology, urbanization, and waste 
disposal (Etnier et al., 2004; Rochelle, Castleberry, & Smith, 2006; The Brazos River 
Authority, 2011). Downstream flows frequently contain treated and untreated sewage 
which creates additional issues among those competing for water (Kelly, 2011; Talbert, 
2008). This competition is not limited to traditional in-stream flows and affected ground 
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waters; disputes over return flows from wastewater treatment plants are becoming 
increasingly common. For example, in the state of Texas, the rights to wastewater return 
flows has been litigated and legislated for years (Beder, 1993; Rochelle et al., 2006). 
As water supplies become more constrained, and conflicts more frequent, public 
policies addressing challenges associated with the management of water resources will 
need to be carefully developed and implemented. Some will be put in place through the 
use of raw political power. Others will fall victim to the skillful use of propaganda or 
persuasive political campaigns. A few will survive the rigorous gauntlet of public 
hearings, negotiations, legislation, and litigation; others will fail to become viable. Most 
will attempt to balance multiple needs and satisfy risk concerns pertaining to political, 
economic, environmental, and social issues. 
Competing needs and perceived risks associated with public water projects are 
often controversial. Despite pressures associated with drought, population growth or 
aging infrastructure, public support for water projects may be weak and opposition 
strong. Recently, in the midst of the driest year on record, a change to the Texas 
constitution allowing the Texas Water Development Board to issue up to 6 billion in 
bonds for water projects barely passed, 51% for and 48% against (Cardona, 2011; Texas 
Legislature, 2011).  
Despite assurances from political leaders that wastewater treatment plants will 
benefit local aquatic ecosystems, enhance residential attractiveness to potential 
homeowners by providing centralized community treatment which would improve land 
values, popular media reports indicate that most people do not consider the siting of a 
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wastewater treatment plant in their neighborhood positively. In fact, such processing 
plants are perceived as risky (Beder, 1993; Fox, 2011; Kelly, 2011; Talbert, 2008). The 
literature confirms that waste water treatment plants adversely affect discharge-receiving 
waterways and aquatic species through the addition of nutrients and chemicals that 
disrupt endocrine systems (Barigozzi & Levaggi, 2010; Caplin & Leahy, 2001; 
Loewenstein, 1987; Slovic, 1987; Starr, 1969), but there have been no published studies 
on the effect of wastewater treatment plants on local property values or residential 
attractiveness. Unlike hazardous waste facility siting, very little research has been done 
on the psychological, environmental, and social effects of the siting of non-hazardous, 
wastewater facilities in communities. Common concerns include offensive odors, health 
effects, disrupting noises, reduced property values, increased traffic, raw sewage spills, 
fish kills, degradation of recreational waters, and the disposal of toxic chemicals into 
local waterways. 
Each of these issues was raised by the Bull Hide Creek Clear Water Alliance, an 
organization composed of people opposing the Bull Hide Creek plant, as well as other 
stakeholders. The members of the opposition also publicly complained that they were the 
victims of political disenfranchisement, environmental injustice, and a state 
environmental protection agency (TCEQ) that failed to comply with its own guidelines 
(Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2009). The proponents of the plant 
argued that each of these issues was being addressed and not only did the plant pose no 
risk to the Bull Hide creek community, it would be a benefit to the community and the 
“quality” of the creek would improve due to increased stream flow. During the 22 month 
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permitting process, a wide range of perceived risks were expressed and addressed within 
a social context that was influenced by risk perception. Despite the frequent use of strict 
financial based cost-benefit analysis, every public policy pertaining to water and 
wastewater is evaluated and implemented in a social context influenced by risk 
perceptions. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1. Uncertainty and Probabilistic Risk 
Uncertainty is a reality of life and always has been. The vagaries of natural 
events and evils such as plagues, pestilence, earthquakes, floods, droughts, crop failures 
and social conflicts have been the source of public and private insecurities throughout 
history (Denney, 2005, p. 7). Industrialization in the nineteenth century and subsequent 
technological advances in the twentieth century produced additional uncertainties that 
were previously incomprehensible to non-industrialized societies, defined as “post 
modern risks” (Beck, 1992). These “post-modern risks” that contemporary societies face 
include, but are not limited to, instabilities because of international economic 
interdependence, threats associated with breaches in communication security, social 
destabilization due to regional political upheaval, political aggression based on 
technologies, religious terrorism, chromosomal damage from pharmaceuticals, diseases 
resulting from agricultural production, and social disequilibrium associated with 
advances in communication (Denney, 2005). 
Individuals, institutions, and societies have responded to this uncertainty, and the 
possibility that one’s actions may have undesirable outcomes, in various ways. They 
have attempted to: isolate themselves from global risks, implement private property 
rights, set up bureaucratic agencies, legislate statutes, promote the return to fundamental 
religious beliefs, establish insurance indemnification procedures, and develop analytical 
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models based on quantitative data designed to predict future uncertainty (Brody, 
Peacock, & Gunn, 2012; Camia, 1994; Erickson, 2001; Rogers et al., 2007; Ross, 2010). 
But what is uncertainty? Douglas Hubbard describes uncertainty as follows: 
“Uncertainty: the lack of complete certainty, that is, the existence of more than one 
possibility. The ‘true’ outcome/state/result/value is not known” (2010, p. 50). 
Uncertainty induces insecurity, leading to the desire to pin down the future state. The 
quality of uncertainty is compounded by the uncomfortable reality that not only is it 
intrusive; its elusive quality frustrates all human attempts to reduce or control it. Many 
people desire a high degree of stability and predictability; however, humanity must 
nonetheless deal with uncertainty in all aspects of life. Webster’s dictionary uses the 
following words to describe the uncertain state: indefinite, indeterminate, problematical, 
untrustworthy, dubious, and doubtful, while Dennis Lindley (Lindley, 2006, p. xi) 
observes that: 
There are some things that you know to be true, and others that you know to be 
false; yet, despite this extensive knowledge that you have, there remain many 
things whose truth or falsity is not known to you. We say that you are uncertain 
about them. You are uncertain, to varying degrees, about everything in the future; 
much of the past is hidden from you; and there is a lot of the present about which 
you do not have full information. Uncertainty is everywhere and you cannot 
escape from it.  
 
The classic definition of risk comes from Frank Hyneman Knight (1921 
paragraph 1.1.26), an economist who wrote his dissertation on risk and uncertainty. His 
work was published as “Risk, Uncertainty and Profit” in 1921 
But uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion 
of risk, from which it has never been properly separated. The term “risk,” as 
loosely used in everyday speech and in economic discussion, really covers two 
things which, functionally at least, in their causal relations to the phenomena of 
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economic organization, are categorically different… The essential fact is that 
“risk” means in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other 
times it is something distinctly not of this character; and there are far reaching and 
crucial differences in the bearings of the phenomenon depending on which of the 
two is really present and operating.  
 
As Knight posits, risk is generally understood to have a probabilistic, or 
measurable, component; there is a mathematical probability that a particular adverse 
event will occur within a well-defined range of time. This probability is used by a 
decision maker to assess if the risk is acceptable or not, and what actions may be taken 
to compensate for the projected risk if it is acceptable. 
Simple risk management based on probabilities generally does not consider 
magnitude. A risk may be low in probability, yet the impacts of the event may be 
profound, and costly, for those affected. For example, the risk of dying in a plane crash 
is calculated by simply taking the population and dividing it by the numbers of deaths 
from plane crashes in any given year (Ropeik & Gray, 2002). The magnitude of the 
impact on those who die in plane crashes, and their families, is not estimated. To 
accommodate this, probabilistic risk may be multiplied by estimated magnitude. 
Similarly, risk analysis often fails to consider individual risk factors, and variables, such 
as whether or not a person flies frequently, the cumulative distance they fly, or whether 
an individual flies commercially or pilots a small private plane.  
Traditional probabilistic risk analysis also fails to consider economic equity, the 
rights of future generations and spatial factors. For example, a political entity may 
decide to spray the interiors of buildings with DDT in an attempt to control the spread of 
malaria by killing or repelling mosquitoes that spread the disease. A simple comparison 
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of the known probabilistic risk from dying from malaria to the probabilistic risk from 
dying from DDT exposure would find a lower associated mortality with the later. 
However, this comparison would not take into consideration the secondary impact on 
avian species. Probabilistic risk also fails to consider that people may not respond to 
objective risk rationally or consistently; people have been observed to respond 
subjectively, emotionally, and dynamically. People have also been observed to not 
respond to risk at all or to use cost benefit analysis to assess acceptable risk. Using the 
previous example, individuals have been known to protest the use of wide spectrum 
insecticides to eradicate mosquitoes on the grounds that sensitive human populations 
will be negatively affected by neurotoxins. Yet others welcome the use of pesticides 
because of the decrease in mosquito populations and consider the risk acceptable 
What is considered acceptable risk? Tom Tietenberg (2006, p. 497), a resource 
economist  defines acceptable risk as “one that maximizes the net benefit” with net 
benefit being defines as the “excess of benefits over costs” (2006, p. 22); in many cases 
there is a time factor with both costs and benefits accruing into the future, therefore an 
adjustment for time sensitive monetary values of benefits and costs may be applied. 
Although objectivity is desired when evaluating acceptable risk, potential bias may be 
present as it is difficult to identify all benefits and costs. Acceptable risk has been linked 
to risk perception through three theoretical schools: the psychological, the cultural, and 
the interdisciplinary. 
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3.2. The Psychological Model of Risk Perception 
The psychological model was developed in the early 1970’s when it became 
apparent that people responded to environmental risks, especially atomic technology 
used for power generation, much differently than expected. Chauncey Starr, (Starr, 
1969) a prominent nuclear engineer, examined this phenomenon and published his 
findings in Science in the article “Social Benefit versus Technological Risk.” He 
concluded people were much more willing to accept voluntary risks than those imposed 
by society because they were able to control their exposure to risk. He also observed, 
“The social acceptance of risk is directly affected by public awareness of the benefits of 
an activity as determined by advertising, usefulness and the number of people 
participating in the activity” (p. 1237). A few years later, two psychologists, Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1979), collaborated in a scholarly investigation into 
human decision making, developing Prospect Theory. This theory challenged classic 
economic utility theory, which postulated people make decisions based on willingness to 
pay and used probabilities to measure potential economic/ monetary gains or losses. 
Prospect Theory weighs probabilities and assigns different weights to gains or losses 
depending on the relative position of the decision maker. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
noted that these probabilities are dependent on perception and the biases and heuristics 
that support those perceptions. 
They expanded on their seminal work and studied how bias and heuristics affect 
risk perception and decision making, determining that people make choices by selecting 
the option that produces the highest potential economic gain (Tversky & Kahneman, 
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1981). A decision will also be influenced on how a choice is framed. Prospective gains 
or losses are assessed relative to dynamic conditions, with prospective losses being 
weighted heavier than prospective gains, and emotionally satisfying choices often being 
preferred over emotionally neutral ones that offered economic gains. This model, 
however, failed to explain why people frequently make choices that do not maximize 
economic personal gain; they act “irrationally” in the classical economic sense. Tversky, 
Kahneman and Slovic proposed that people evaluate utility within a social framework 
that considers happiness, social impacts, quantitative probability, and personal heuristics 
(Daniel  Kahneman, Tversky, & Slovic, 1982 ). Classic economic utility theory was 
challenged by the concept that emotions influence rational decision making. 
Caplin and Leahy (2001) found the desire to reduce anxiety resulting from 
uncertainty may lead to poor decision making as a person’s desire to reduce their anxiety 
and fear may dominate a desire for economic gain. The role of emotions in decision 
making was also explored by Barigozzi and Levaggi (2010). In their work they 
discussed the role information plays in decision making and pointed out that physical 
costs are frequently outweighed by emotional costs associated with negative 
information. This leads people to prefer uncertainty based on paucity of knowledge to 
the distress associated with full information that confirms a negative outcome. Time is 
another factor that has been shown to be associated with decision making. Caplin and 
Leahy (Caplin & Leahy, 2001) studied the effect of time as a determinant on 
psychological expected utility, finding people preferred to reduce the amount of time 
associated with an uncertainty that is perceived with negative anticipatory emotions. 
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“Just get it over with because it’s going to hurt” is preferable to “Let me delay my 
punishment as long as possible.” Their findings complimented part of an earlier study 
which found people tend to delay a decision if positive anticipatory emotions are present 
(Loewenstein, 1987) but contradicted Lowenstein’s findings that people will delay 
decisive actions if dread (the imagining of a terrible outcome) is present. 
That same year, Paul Slovic (Slovic, 1987) published research in Science that 
demonstrated perceived risk could be quantitatively measured using psychometric 
factors. He affirmed that variables such as dread, loss of control, involuntariness, 
familiarity, presence of catastrophic potential, equity, risk to future generations, potential 
benefits, and global impacts were significant factors in how non-expert individuals 
perceive risk, risk benefit, and risk acceptance. He later addressed how experts measured 
riskiness in terms of annual mortality or injuries (Slovic, 1987). In 2005, he and his 
colleagues noted risk perception has an affective component: “Risk is perceived and 
acted on in two fundamental ways. Risk as feelings refers to individuals’ fast, 
instinctive, and intuitive reactions to danger. Risk as analysis brings logic, reason, and 
scientific deliberation to bear on risk management” (Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & 
MacGregor, 2005, p. 35). Although risk managers and analysts have historically 
approached perceived risk from a methodical, systematic manner, psychological, 
affective and emotional factors clearly influence risk perception as well. 
3.3. The Cultural Model of Risk Perception 
An English anthropologist, Mary Douglas, and an American political scientist, 
Aaron Wildavsky, introduced the theory that risk perception was best explained by 
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culture (1982). Presented in Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical 
and Environmental Dangers, their work postulated that individuals act on perceived 
risks within an environmental and social context dependent on cultural constructs and 
behaviors. They emphasized that individuals make risk decisions based on moral values, 
political views, economic position, and social constructs rather than on assessments that 
are empirical, objective, evidential, and rational. In addition, societies determine what is 
identified as a risk, what risks are acceptable and “who should be allowed to take them” 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 6). They noted people worry about things their societies 
collectively identify as dangerous and dismiss those things that are considered benign 
and/or acceptable. 
In the postmodern world, concerns about environmental and technological safety 
dominate, yet fears of food scarcity, economic collapse, and political oppression could 
just as easily cause alarm in the general population. In searching for an explanation as to 
why environmental and technical risks were considered greater risks, Douglas and 
Wildavsky (1982) identified three qualities associated with such risks that were not 
associated with risks considered acceptable. Unacceptable risks included technological 
and environmental risks, which were considered to have hidden, irreversible, and 
involuntary threats to personal well-being. Such risks create feelings of vulnerability, 
helplessness, and fear. 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) also note that moral judgments regarding risk are 
evaluated within the context of a social standard of normality. But what constitutes 
normal? In Risk and Culture, the authors consider normal risks to be those accepted by a 
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culture, those judged to be “normal” are more acceptable than those that are judged to be 
unusual. Those that are not acceptable are “blameworthy.” Blameworthy risks may 
produce damages which can be mitigated and litigated in the legal arena. According to 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), damages can also be assessed and recovered if the risks 
and associated losses can be judged as unjust. 
They compare the perceived risk associated with nuclear power plants to the risk 
of dying from chicken pox. Although the risk of dying from a nuclear accident is much 
lower than the risk of dying from chicken pox, one is judged to be normal, and therefore 
more acceptable than the other, which is considered to be the result of technological 
failure and therefore, not a normal death. A death resulting from a nuclear accident is 
one in which blame and liability can be assigned. Unlike a death from a communicable 
virus, society has taken the position that someone is responsible for technological 
failures. There are others who reject technology because they believe the risks associated 
with the technology are not identified correctly, the true risks are minimized, the benefits 
of the technology are exaggerated, or the magnitude of the risks to individuals exceed 
the potential communal benefits that may be acquired through the technology. 
Trust is also associated with technology and risk perception. Commonly, society 
assigns liability for harm resulting from technological failure in which there was a 
breach of trust. Did the person harmed give their consent? Were the risks imposed on an 
unknowing party by another person or agency that was considered trustworthy? Teuber 
(1990) emphasized that “modern” social morality requires that people should not have 
risks imposed on them without their consent. Obtaining the consent of people who are 
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research subjects is a concept that was developed post World War II due to the horrors 
of Nazi experimentation on human subjects (Wedeen, 2000). The first codified standard 
was the 1949 Nuremberg Code, with the Helsinki Declaration of 1964 and the Belmont 
Report of 1979 coming later. All concerned informed consent and ethics. In 1990-1991, 
the European Union and the United States adopted additional guidelines (The Common 
Rule) that concerned the use of individuals for the common good, this policy has been 
revised multiple times ("Codex, rules and guidelines for research," 2013; The United 
States Government, 2009). These guidelines established that people should not have 
risks imposed on them without their consent because to do so is unethical and unjust 
(Wedeen, 2000). What is considered to be unjust is a cultural construct reflecting 
temporal standards. 
Justice and ethics are culturally defined concepts that originate and are 
maintained by social relationships, including institutions. The concept of justice is 
directly dependent on the contemporary cultural norm, which has been established by the 
international agreements, that it is unethical to subject people to risks they are unaware 
of or unable to resist. Berger and Luckmann (1966) argued that such norms are the result 
of human interactions; within these interactions, there is an assumption of common 
values. Common values between cultures and social consensus determine, to a large 
extent, what is considered a risk. “Social order is a human product, or, more precisely, 
an ongoing human production. It is only produced by man in the course of his ongoing 
externalization” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 52). 
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Dake also explored the role of society pertaining to personal risk perception in 
the early 1990’s and argued in his dissertation and published studies that an individual’s 
risk perception is not simply a function of the political, historical, and social context. He 
theorized that an individual’s perception of the world will have an influence on his 
perceptions. He demonstrated that risk perception also corresponds to “worldviews” of 
society, technologies, and the environment and identified two main contemporary 
“worldviews” (Dake, 1991). Contemporary Worldview A, embraces a free market 
economy oriented toward business and materialistic goals, which encourages and 
emphasizes rapid technological development with an emphasis on individualism. 
Worldview B encourages environmental protection, redistribution of wealth, social 
responsibility, collectivism and non-materialistic values. According to Dake, a person’s 
worldview will influence his perception of the risks associated with emerging 
technologies and the environment, as well as how they respond to potential hazards. He 
also researched how a person’s cultural orientation and how they define social 
relationships may influence a person’s attitude towards risk and found that a person’s 
cultural bias/personality (hierarchal, individual or egalitarian) was correlated with 
societal risk taking or risk aversion. The correlations ranged from -.39-.60 (p < .001), 
thus verifying the theory that cultural orientation could be a valid predictor of risk 
perception (Dake, 1991). Dake believed this data, based on n=134, could be aggregated 
and extrapolated to the collective level. 
Approximately ten years after his research was published, it was challenged by 
Rippl (2002, p. 154) who believed the correlations were weak and cultural biases of a 
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group cannot be measured using personality characteristics attributed to individuals. 
Thus leading Rippl to conclude Dake’s quantitative work could not be used to explain 
the cultural theory of risk perception. Believing the theory was theoretically sound, but 
statistically weak, Rippl re-examined the premise using a structural equation model 
using item wording and factor analysis to identify and measure latent processes and 
connections between the four cultural orientations identified by Douglas and Wildavsky 
(hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism). She found the explanatory 
power increased, leading her to conclude cultural theory can be used to explain risk 
perception. Essentially, her findings giving credence to the theory that an individual’s 
cultural values play an important role in how individuals evaluate risk (Rippl, 2002).  
Postmodernism, a cultural theory introduced by Ronald Inglehart in the 1970’s 
has been compared to Dake’s Worldview B. However, Inglehart hypothesized that as 
societies experience greater economic affluence and stability, societal values change 
pervasively and predictably. Specifically, postmodern economic security reduces basic 
survival concerns and there is an intergenerational shift from an “emphasis on economic 
and physical security, toward increasing emphasis on self-expression, subjective well 
being and quality of life concerns. Postmaterialist values emerge among birth cohorts 
that grew up under conditions that enable one to take survival for granted” (Ronald  
Inglehart, 2003, p. 130). Inglehart postulated when societal survival risks are reduced, 
risks associated with individual quality of life factors can now be addressed. 
Inglehart based his work on the World Values surveys which were first carried 
out in 1981. They were again administered in 1990, 2000, 2005, 2006, 2010, 2011, and 
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will be conducted out again in 2013. These surveys examined and analyzed evolutionary 
cultural changes in 90% of the world’s population (100 societies on six inhabited 
continents) and the impact these changes have had on societies (The World Values 
Survey, 2012). He concluded that changing cultural values have long lasting effects on 
beliefs and institutions; resulting in changing cultural values which subsequently affect 
risk perceptions. He also noted that individuals in societies which are post-materialistic, 
emphasize tolerance and self-expression, are happier, encourage interpersonal trust, 
imagination, environmental protection, and are more democratic. Interestingly, he 
observed that psychological stress associated with perceived risks is not only “culturally 
conditioned” but continues to be present in postmodern societies (Ronald Inglehart, 
1997, p. 450). 
Inglehart and Norris, in a more recent publication (2011), based on the World 
Values Survey, emphasized that empirically measuring personal risk perception in the 
context of culture is difficult as criteria may be value laden and highly complex. By 
utilizing factor analysis and ordinary least squares, they were able to identify specific 
cultural factors applicable to reducing risk. Among their findings was the positive impact 
increased security has on post-modern societies. They concluded that individual’s risk 
perception on the micro, meso and macro levels is a significant factor driving human 
behavior; this has profound social consequences. In addition, these social changes do not 
necessarily produce better objective estimates of risk; people’s risk perceptions are 
highly subjective (Wolfe & McGinn, 2005). 
 20 
 
 
The importance of cultural biases and risk perception, and its relevance to policy 
development, has been the subject of the Cultural Cognition Project, located at the Yale 
Law School. This research group has sought to explain the polarization that frequently 
accompanies risk perception and associated policy disputes (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, 
Gastil, & Cohen, 2007). Their research is focused on a basic premise of cultural theory 
introduced and consistently reiterated by Kahan: “that individuals can be expected to 
form beliefs about societal dangers that reflect and reinforce their commitments to one or 
another idealized form of social ordering” (Kahan, 2012, p. 726). Cultural cognition is 
defined as: “the tendency of individuals to conform their beliefs about disputed matters 
of fact (e.g. whether global warming is a serious threat; whether the death penalty deters 
murder; whether gun control makes society more safe or less) to values that define their 
cultural identities” (The Yale Law School, 2013). Using an empirical approach they 
found cultural cognition can be used to measure, individuals’ cultural worldviews and 
the social and psychological mechanisms that connect individuals. They showed that the 
worldview typologies Douglas and Wildavsky identified (hierarchical, egalitarian, 
individualistic and communitarian) were explanatory variables in risk perception and 
supported what Kahan had found earlier. That “individuals form factual beliefs that 
reflect and reinforce competing cultural orientations” (Kahan, 2008, p. 43). The four 
typologies were visually explained on a grid with two axes. One axis (x axis) measured 
how individualistic or communitarian a person was and the other (y axis) measured how 
hierarchal or egalitarian they were. The grid was then compared to respondents’ answers 
to survey questions. 
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The research showed that people, who placed a high value on individualism 
tended to value business and industry, were inclined to trust political institutions, and 
believed that goods and services should be distributed according to clearly defined 
attributes such as wealth, education, ethnicity, and gender. Individualists tended to 
believe that people are responsible for securing their own well-being while those who 
were more egalitarian held that society should provide collective assistance. People who 
had views that were more egalitarian supported the distribution of goods and services 
equally, without regard for social ordering; communitarians are more inclined to support 
policies that place a higher value on societal interests over those of the individual 
(Kahan et al., 2007). For example, an egalitarian and communitarian would be more 
inclined to support policies protecting the environment than subsidies that encourage 
industrial extraction of natural resources. Kahan found, “These cultural orientations 
shape how individuals perceive risk” (Kahan, 2008 abstract). Thus, lending support to 
the concept cultural theory can be used to understand public risk perceptions as well as 
the origins of potential conflicts associated with policy development and 
implementation.  
3.4. The Interdisciplinary Model: The Social Amplification of Risk Framework  
Risk perception has also been examined within a multidisciplinary framework 
introduced by Roger E. Kasperson, Ortwin Renn, Paul Slovic, Halina Brown, Jacque 
Emel, Robert Goble, Jeanne Kasperson, and Samuel Ratick in 1988 and termed the 
Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF). This work identified and linked 
dynamic psychological, social, institutional, and cultural variables to risk perception, 
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with culture being considered a “super variable” affecting both social amplification and 
attenuation of risk perception (Kasperson et al., 1988). 
SARF (Social Amplification of Risk Framework) is not considered a theoretical 
model by its developers; they consider it an interdisciplinary framework with two parts 
that, “aims to examine broadly, and in social and historical context, how risk and risk 
events interact with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes in ways 
that amplify or attenuate risk perceptions and concerns, and thereby shape risk behavior, 
influence institutional processes, and affect risk consequences” (Pidgeon, Kasperson, & 
Slovic, 2003, p. 2).  
The first part (Stage 1) is analogous to the process an electrical signal travels that 
once activated passes through “stations” which act on the current, either amplifying or 
attenuating it. Some of the recognized stations are: filters that only allow partial 
information to reach the receiver; ones that decode, sort, and interpret the signal and 
others that affect the characteristics of the signal. When the signal leaves the stations, not 
only has its form been modified, it produces secondary effects. The SARF model terms 
these effects, Stage 2. Stage 2 may include economic effects, institutional changes, 
social changes and political actions. Perceptions are changed, opinions are challenged, 
laws are passed, conflicts arise, and settlements take place. 
I found the framework provided an excellent structural model for examining 
perceived risk with a significant limitation; the framework does not “address the basic 
political, sociological, or psychological processes which might underlie amplification or 
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attenuation of risk signals and perceptions in any specific context” (Schattschneider, 
1983, p. 4). The editors of The Social Amplification of Risk affirmed this and noted:  
As yet, there has been no systematic exploration of how SARF and the empirical 
results of the past fifteen years can be applied to various public policy matters. 
Yet there is an urgent need for social analysis of risk to suggest approaches and 
processes that have the potential to improve society’s ability to anticipate, 
diagnose, prioritize, and respond to the continuing flow of risk issues that 
confront, and often confound, society’s risk processing and management 
functions (Pidgeon et al., 2003, p. 41). 
 
Although the frame work is limited, the two part structure of the SARF 
framework provides a useful platform for examining the role of risk perception in a 
specific policy analysis. It will be used in this paper to examine the permitting of a 
proposed wastewater treatment plant on Bull Hide Creek in Central Texas. The first part 
of the framework, Stage I, identifies variables, patterns, and relationships that may 
amplify or attenuate perceived risk and affect a Stage II outcome. This thesis examined 
three Stage I variables, resources, trust, and risk communication, which affected 
perceived risk pertaining to the proposed Bull Hide Creek wastewater plant, and how 
they may have contributed to a Stage II outcome. The conclusive Stage II outcome in 
this case was a regulatory decision to issue a permit to construct a wastewater treatment 
plant on Bull Hide Creek in McLennan County, Texas. 
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4. VARIABLES AND FRAMEWORK 
 
In this case study, a framework based on the Social Amplification of Risk 
Framework incorporating three variables associated with risk perception was used to 
study a policy decision to build a wastewater treatment plant. The event triggering the 
perceived risk was considered to be the independent variable (the factor believed to 
influence the dependent variable). This was the filing of the application by WMARSS 
(Waco Metropolitan Area Regional Sewerage System) with the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to construct a wastewater treatment plant on Bull Hide 
Creek and discharge effluent. The dependent variable (the factor the case study sought to 
understand) was the issuance of the permit to operate the Bull Hide Creek wastewater 
treatment plant. The intervening variables (the factors believed to influence the 
dependent variable) used in this case were resources (power, money, political influence 
and social capital), risk communication, and trust. The objective of this case study was to 
examine a singular event in detail in an attempt to understand the interactions of the 
variables and their relationship with the stakeholders. Stakeholders were defined as those 
who were involved in the policy making process for they would be impacted by the 
outcome. Although this policy decision would affect numerous citizens in the area, only 
those actively involved in the conflict were included in the research as stakeholders.  
This analysis has produced a level of understanding that the author feels can be 
applied to future water policy issues using the comparative method. As Hague, Martin 
and Breslin (1998, p. 276) point out, “In consequence, much comparative political 
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analysis takes the form not of relating cases to abstract political theory but simply of 
drawing analogies between the cases themselves.” 
4.1. Resources 
In any policy decision process, effective utilization of resources has a significant 
influence on risk perception. Managing resources, however, is a complex, difficult, time 
consuming, competitive endeavor. The party, or parties, that are most able to accomplish 
the task with strategic tactics will most likely achieve their desired outcome. There are 
four significant resources that contributed to the amplification and attenuation of 
perceived risk in this case study: power, money, political influence, and social capital. 
Stakeholders competed for control of, and use of, these resources to influence both the 
process and outcome of the conflict. Of these four resources, power was perhaps the 
most important as it had the potential to acquire, control or mitigate others (money, 
political influence, and social influence). It should be noted that if there is a strong 
element of trust between the parties, competition for resources may be reduced due to 
increased efficiency of risk communication and productive negotiation. 
4.1.1. Power 
Power can be simply defined as the ability, or potential, to effect change. It is a 
recognized, complex, ubiquitous, relational force that is at times dynamic, or stable, 
equitable, or unequal, benign or destructive, collaborative or unilateral, coercive or 
persuasive, and overt or covert. For centuries, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, 
anthropologists, and political observers from Plato to Flyvbjerg have studied and 
analyzed its characteristics and applications (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Plato, 380 BCE). For the 
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purposes of this thesis, the five types of power as described by Raven and French (1959) 
were used: 
 Coercive - the use of punishment when non-compliant 
 Reward - the ability to give rewards after compliance 
 Referent - associated with identification or admiration  
 Legitimate - inherent in the role or position and 
 Expert - associated with expertise and knowledge. 
Raven and French later added informational power to their model (Raven, 1965). 
Understanding the types of power that exist, who or what possesses power and how 
it is exercised is critically important to understanding policy conflict and resolution. 
Each stakeholder in every policy conflict possesses power; whether they are able to 
muster enough additional power to change, or resist a challenge to, the status quo is the 
question. In addition, power is dynamic, transitory, and fluid; depending on how 
effective a stakeholder can acquire, maintain, or utilize resources, it may flow from one 
stakeholder to another. 
One of the most useful resources used to acquire power is money; it is commonly 
utilized by those who wish to amplify or attenuate perceived risk. 
4.1.2. Money 
How to define money, the universal medium of exchange, is a topic that has been 
debated, analyzed, and discussed for centuries. One of the most cited definitions can be 
found in the 1844 writings of Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts (Third 
Manuscript, chapter four: The Power of Money): “Money is the procurer between man’s 
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need and the object, between his life and his means of life” (Marx, 1959, p. unpaginated 
manuscript). Thus, it serves an economic function. Traditionally, this function has been 
viewed as meeting three social needs: a medium of exchange, a standard of measurement 
with established value, and a store of value. In the 20th century it was defined as, “The 
stock of assets that can be readily used to make a transaction” (Mankiw, 2010, p. 80). 
Not only does money enable and support economic functions in society, people 
seek the acquisition of money as a means to an end; money influence a person’s 
appearance and social standing. Karl Marx, examined the human relationship with 
money in his manuscript citing an early 1800’s quote by Goethe which offered an 
explanation as to why money is so important to people. 
The extent of the power of money is the extent of my power. Money’s properties 
are my, the possessor’s, properties, and essential powers. Thus, what I am and am 
capable of is by no means determined by my individuality. I am ugly, but I can 
buy for myself the most beautiful of women. Therefore I am not ugly, for the 
effect of ugliness its deterrent power is nullified by money. I, according to my 
individual characteristics, am lame, but money furnishes me with twenty-four 
feet. Therefore I am not lame. I am bad, dishonest, unscrupulous, stupid; but 
money is honoured, and hence its possessor. Money is the supreme good; 
therefore its possessor is good. Money, besides, saves me the trouble of being 
dishonest: I am therefore presumed honest. I am brainless, but money is the real 
brain of all things and how then should its possessor be brainless? Besides, he can 
buy clever people for himself, and is he who has power over the clever not more 
clever than the clever? Do not I, who thanks to money am capable of all that the 
human heart longs for, possess all human capacities? Does not my money, 
therefore, transform all my incapacities into their contrary? (Marx, 1959). 
 
Thus, it is recognized to have a secondary psycho-social economic value; those 
who possess it are perceived differently than those who do not. A recent Internet blog 
concerning an email containing “before and after” pictures of unattractive vs. attractive 
women addressed this phenomenon. Women were presented in a poverty state and then 
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were “changed” through expensive make-over’s; the conclusion announced, “There are 
no ugly women, only poor women” (Singer, 2010). The associated discussion affirmed 
the after pictures of the women were considered more attractive, confirming that money 
could be used to alter one’s attractiveness.  Thus establishing a positive relationship 
between money and social attractiveness (Singer, 2010). Studies have affirmed money is 
associated with status, respect, autonomy, attractiveness, happiness, achievement, 
morality, goodness (or evil), and power (Engelberg & Sjöberg, 2007; Kasser & Ryan, 
1993; Wernimont & Fitzpatrick, 1972); it can be used to win friends and influence 
people (Carnegie, 1937). Research has also shown it is a powerful tool used to acquire 
political power, which is essential to the formulation and implementation of public 
policy (Gordon & Hartmann, 2013). 
Because money is a means of acquiring personal social status, attractiveness and 
political power; there are clear rewards to possessing money. There are also dangers. In 
Timothy 6:10 of the Bible, it is said, “For the love of money is a root of all kinds of evil” 
(King james bible,). Whether it functions as a tool, a status symbol, a simple method of 
exchange or a source of power, money is a critically important resource in any policy 
conflict.  
4.1.3. Social Influence 
Social influence may be defined as having the ability to effect a change in the 
attitudes, behaviors, emotions, or opinions of others within a social context. It is 
typically used in policy conflicts by people who are perceived as leaders in the group as 
a way of strengthening their negotiating position. Social theory holds that social 
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influence is derived from meeting various psychological needs of individuals.  These 
needs include, but are not limited to: 
 the desire to identify with someone who is popular, liked and respected, 
 the psychological need to conform to what is perceived as a common belief or 
expectation, 
 the need to fulfill expectations of others, 
 the acceptance and internalization of a cultural opinion or belief, 
 the need to be socially compliant, 
 the need to establish independence from a social standard or group (anti-
conformity), 
 the association between compliance and reward associated with scarcity, and 
 the need for social self-preservation (people do not want to be ostracized). 
Along with the rewards inherent in these psychological needs, one must consider that 
individuals respond to social influence for various reasons (motivators) and have 
expectations of social gains when they do so (Kelman, 1958). 
4.1.4. Political Influence  
Political influence is a resource frequently used to moderate perceived risk. 
Influence is defined by the Miriam-Webster Dictionary as, “the power or capacity of 
causing an effect in indirect or intangible ways” with political being loosely defined as 
that which relates to political structure, government, and related public institutions 
(Merriam-Webster, 2012). For the purposes of this paper, political influence will be 
defined as the exercise of using persuasion (both direct and indirect) to determine “who 
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gets what, when and how” to affect changes in public policy development and 
implementation, in the direction preferred by the individual or group exercising the 
persuasion (Lasswell, 1958). It differs from political power in that those exercising 
political influence do not possess the ability to either make policy or implement it. They 
must convince those who do have the authority to make and implement policy that their 
position is paramount and should be supported. This may be accomplished, or attempted, 
through various means. One of the most famous examples of non-violent political 
influence is the campaign by Mohandas Gandhi in India in the early 20th century. This 
campaign encouraged and utilized the use of civil disobedience as a means to pressure 
political leaders to change policies. In contrast, violence is often employed by those who 
attempt to exercise political influence. For example, radical fringe groups use terrorism 
to call attention to, and influence, changes in political policies. The use of political 
influence may have immediate, latent or delayed effects, and may be subject to 
tangential events. 
4.2. Risk Communication 
The ability to effectively convey potential risk is a resource stakeholders may use 
to amplify or attenuate perceived risk. The National Research Council defines risk 
communication as: “an interactive process of exchange of information and opinion 
among individuals, groups, and institutions,” rather than a one way message from 
experts to non-experts (Committee on Risk Perception and Communication, 1989, p. 2). 
Ideally, it is a dialogic, collaborative, two-way process that includes the public and all 
stakeholders, especially in environmental policy matters. At its best, good risk 
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communication produces honesty, transparency and a sincere desire to reach consensus; 
the result is improved decision making, increased public participation, better 
bureaucratic outcomes and healthier communities. At its worst, poor risk communication 
may result in restricted discourse, the suppression of dissent, concealed facts, dishonesty, 
hostile disagreement and an emphasis is on winning without regard for other 
stakeholders’ losses.  
4.3. Trust 
Uncertainty associated with limited information can be mitigated through social 
mechanisms. Information is important to our survival, but it is impossible to personally 
acquire comprehensive and complete information pertaining to risk, or any other subject. 
Therefore, the ability to obtain, or utilize, information through social relationships is 
critically important. This requires trusting the source of the information. Trust can be 
defined as, “an expression of confidence in another person…that you will not be put at 
risk, harmed or injured by [his/her] actions” (Cheng, 2009, p. 1). “Trust is based on 
confidence associated with the relationship as well as one’s ability to effectively validate 
the source via direct or indirect experiential results” (Schattschneider, 1983, p. xvii). It is 
also a strategy for risk reduction that is dependent on multiple factors such as 
experience, perception, honesty, credibility, gender, and expertise (Bos, Terburg, & Van 
Honk, 2010; Pidgeon et al., 2003, p. 125:126). People who consistently exhibit integrity 
are considered more trustworthy; trustworthiness is also positively correlated to 
character, ethics, morality, and respect. Trust takes years to establish, yet it is fragile, 
ephemeral, and quickly destroyed or damaged by a lack of integrity, unethical behavior, 
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or betrayal. Once damaged, it is difficult to restore and some relationships never recover. 
A quote attributed to Abraham Lincoln states it concisely. “If you once forfeit the 
confidence of your fellow citizens, you can never regain their respect and esteem.” 
Figure 1: Variables and Framework 
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5. METHODS 
 
5.1. Research Techniques 
The research focus was acquiring information on the project, the role of the 
stakeholders and the factors affecting the outcome. The information was then examined 
within a theoretical framework in an effort to reach a general understanding of what had 
transpired. It is hoped that the synthesized knowledge can be applied to future policy 
development studies. 
The primary method used to acquire information was participant observation. I 
attended and took notes at most of the public meetings, including the public hearing 
conducted by TCEQ, meetings of the Bull Hide Creek Clearwater Alliance (the grass 
roots organization founded to fight the proposed plant), numerous Lorena and Hewitt 
city council meetings, the meeting between representatives of the Bull Hide Creek 
Clearwater Alliance (BHCCWA) and the City of Waco at the state representative’s 
office (Doc Anderson), a meeting between the legal counsel representing the BHCCWA 
and a BHCCWA representative, a meeting establishing which parties would be given 
standing for the SOAH process (State Office of Administrative Hearings), county 
commissioner’s meetings, a press conference, and two fundraisers. At these meetings, I 
observed the interactions between the parties, the verbiage that was used, the physical 
environment and the emotional context and exchanges between the stakeholders and 
others. If notes were not taken at the actual meeting, they were written up upon returning 
home. 
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The secondary research method was examining pertinent written materials to the 
case study that were available. This included the contract (the Interlocal agreement 
between WMARSS and the City of Lorena, city council minutes, correspondence 
among, and between, participants, newspaper articles pertaining to the issue, litigation 
filings, legal rulings, and all official documents on file with TCEQ, such as the permits, 
the Agreed Order, historical City files (both Waco and Lorena), violations and 
enforcement actions, the public comments pertaining to the permits, and the SOAH 
documents. Electronic correspondence between stakeholders was also examined. 
5.2. Role of the Researcher 
Residents of the Bull Hide community were invited to a short presentation by 
representatives of the R.W. Beck Engineering firm at the local high school on March 20, 
2008. To their surprise and dismay, they were informed that a regional wastewater 
treatment facility would be constructed in their neighborhood on the popular creek. 
Although the project had been planned for over ten years, this was the first time any of 
the residents had been contacted. They had not been included in the planning and their 
input has not been solicited. They were simply given a brief presentation as to what was 
going to transpire. Not surprisingly, they were enraged, offended, alarmed and quickly 
mobilized to hold a community meeting the following Tuesday. A friend of mine who 
lived close to the plant asked me to attend that meeting.  
After that meeting, I decided to research the subject. Within a few days, I began 
the process of researching the permit status (the first permit had been filed in 2007 with 
a second permit being filed the previous week), reviewing contracts and RFP’s (Request 
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for Proposal) through open records requests, looking at statistics, carefully reading 
environmental impact studies, and meeting with concerned citizens who had formed a 
grassroots organization opposing the plant. Three months after I began collecting data, I 
had a conversation with a member of the Lorena Chamber of Commerce. After 15 
minutes of going over numbers and contracts which I thought clearly indicated that plant 
would be a negative financial investment for Lorena, she calmly looked at me and asked, 
“Why do you hate us?” I realized then there was an unknown element to the problem I 
was unaware of beyond a financial analysis, planning for future needs or trying to 
resolve an environmental problem. I then began to search for the unknown factor from 
an academic perspective. What unrecognized factors were present, how were they 
influencing the developing policy issue, what theoretical fundamentals were applicable 
and were there similar cases in the literature? 
5.3. Case History and Background 
This case examined the successful acquisition of a permit to dispose of municipal 
wastewater outside the city limits of the producing communities by a public water 
utility, despite the protests of the citizens of the receiving area. These two cities, Lorena 
and Hewitt, had experienced rapid growth (see Appendix E) as people moved to the area 
seeking good schools, low crime rates, affordable housing, new construction, open 
spaces, family-oriented neighborhoods, and close proximity to the City of Waco. Both 
cities, in an effort to conserve valuable developable land, exploit economies of scale, 
reduce costs, outsource management, and expand their treatment capacity joined a 
wastewater consortium established by the City of Waco, the Waco Metropolitan Area 
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Regional Sewerage System (WMARSS). The City of Waco solicited their participation 
and received benefits related to operating expenses, sales of energy, effluent, and other 
by-products, as well as funds from federal grants which were used to subsidize their 
share of the project. These direct advantages to the participating municipalities, as well 
as indirect advantages, such as the opportunity for WMARSS to externalize 
environmental and developmental costs to the receiving area, were significant. 
Lorena was experiencing difficulty managing and maintaining their plant. They 
had reached maximum treatment capacity, were experiencing sewage spills, had ongoing 
mechanical problems at the plant, infiltration of rainwater and exfiltration of sewage due 
to leaking sewer pipe, and were under an enforcement order from the Texas Commission 
on Environmental Quality. In addition, they were operating under the terms of an Agreed 
Order which stipulated Lorena would address the problems associated with the plants 
and join a regional wastewater consortium by February 2010, the expected completion 
date of the Bull Hide plant. Opponents of the new plant believed once the problems at 
the plant and the sewer infrastructure were addressed a new plant would no longer be 
needed (J.B. Smith, 2009b). They also pointed out a sister plant operating in the City of 
Moody, Texas had no problems yet was the same age. It was also argued that the City of 
Lorena’s plant site had room for expansion if the City vehicles being stored on the 
property were relocated. 
A direct result of the regulatory sanctions imposed by TCEQ was the 
implementation of a construction moratorium by the city council; this moratorium 
created a wide range of negative impacts on the community (City of Lorena, 2009; J.B.  
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Smith, 2009b). This included a lawsuit filed by a developer who had been working with 
the city to develop a housing subdivision. The construction had been approved by the 
council and was well under way when the moratorium was implemented, resulting in 
significant financial losses to the developer (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2010). The 
lawsuit was not common knowledge in the community, but the Lorena City Council, the 
Lorena Chamber of Commerce, and WMARSS made a concerted effort to publicize the 
fact that the Lorena area could not capitalize on expected growth without joining 
WMARSS and acquiring additional treatment capacity (J.B. Smith, 2009b). The 
necessity for growth was intensely promoted to the community but growth was never 
clearly defined and the costs associated with growth were never identified (WMARSS, 
2013).  
In March of 2008, WMARSS sent out a letter to land owners living close to a 
section of Bull Hide Creek near the City of Lorena apprising them of a meeting. The 
meeting would be held at the local high school and would introduce the project. The 
letter sending notice of a public meeting, the filing of permit WQ0014889001, and the 
announcement of the purchase of the land all took place on the same day, March 20, 
2008. Land owners in close proximity to the site, directors of the Levi Water Supply, 
and other stakeholders were never given an opportunity to participate in a collaborative 
decision making process and they reacted strongly to these events; they felt they had 
been excluded from decisions that affected them. When they found documents, and 
heard statements by City of Waco’s officials, that confirmed discussions had been taking 
place for over ten years, they were angry, frightened, and alarmed (Clemons, 2012; 
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Gonzalez, 2009). When it became known that a previous permit to increase the 
wastewater effluent from the existing Lorena plant, had been filed with TCEQ on 
February 9, 2007, many Bull Hide creek residents were furious. Permit 
#WQ0014782001 would have expanded Lorena’s current plant and continued to 
discharge effluent into Cow Bayou tributary. They felt this proved a history of excluding 
stakeholders in policy deliberations and clearly demonstrated there had been another 
option to the construction of the Bull Hide plant. However, because it involved an 
existing plant in Lorena, land owners on Bull Hide creek were not apprised nor included 
in any planning discussions. The suspicion that resulted from the filings was an 
unresolved issue for years and contributed to the amplification of perceived risk. 
Contributing to the distrust was the lack of “explosion of growth” in Lorena after 
the City connected to the wastewater plant in 2012 as had been predicted (Shapiro, 
2012). This may be partially explained because this was during one of the slowest 
housing construction periods in history and a national economy that was depressed 
(Evatt, 2012). Opponents, however, had insisted since March of 2008 that a new plant 
was not needed, simply better management and maintenance; man believed Lorena 
would not experience growth with a new plant due to higher taxes and utility rates 
resulting from costs associated with the new plant. 
This conflict is typical of those found in areas of urban expansion. Like so many 
rural landowners, the Bull Hide community desired to maintain the status quo of their 
rural neighborhood and preserve the natural state of their local waterway. As in cases 
involving locally unwanted land uses (LULUS) the residents expressed concern about 
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the risks this plant would present to their well-being and feared the uncertainties they 
perceived.1 
5.4. Stakeholders  
As in many environmental policy conflicts, the evolution and resolution of the 
sewage treatment issue had significant impacts on multiple stakeholders. Not all 
stakeholders were satisfied with the outcome and it can be argued that the perceived 
risks and potential benefits were not equitably distributed. Contemporary planning 
procedures advocate an attempt should be made to integrate the needs of all stakeholders 
when making changes within or across watersheds and joint discussion sessions should 
be held. Like so many watershed issues, this one was further complicated because it 
crossed political boundaries. Because all the stakeholders were not included in the 
planning process, their needs could not be considered nor provided for. When opposition 
stakeholders organized, they became aware of separate communications and “deals” 
                                                 
1 A LULU is a land use that is necessary for community welfare, yet few people want in 
their neighborhoods as it presents both real and perceived risks. The term LULU is an 
acronym introduced by Frank J. Popper in “The Environmentalist and the LULU” and 
has is associated with expanding population demands (Popper, 1985). Examples of 
LULUS include, but are not limited to, landfills, power plants, prisons, and as in this 
case, wastewater treatment plants. Typically, LULU’s are sited in areas where the 
residents have limited political power and economic resources. However, studies suggest 
that this is due to the low cost of the land, not the economic status of the residents. Ways 
of overcoming the objections of local residents to LULU’s include collaborative 
planning, compensation for the external costs associated with the LULU, distribution of 
benefits and incentives to local landowners and use of institutional resources to “win” 
the conflict. Some stakeholders, such as those in the Owens Valley in California 
resisting the diversion of their water to Los Angeles, have resorted to violence and 
sabotage (1924). Compensatory actions by governmental entities may include 
implementation of environmental regulations and legislation, monitoring of the 
objectionable project by a neutral party, the institutionalization of processes intended to 
deal with emerging issues, subsidies to those in the impacted area, zoning restrictions, 
escrow funding for future damages and tax incentives 
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offered by the City of Waco to individual stakeholders which led to a lack of trust, 
entrenchment, refusal to negotiate and costly legal action (J.B. Smith, 2009).  
The stakeholders who are perceived to hold the most power will tend to dominate 
the negotiating structure and process (Wolfe & McGinn, 2005). In this case, the City of 
Waco was the principal stakeholder with the City of Lorena in a secondary role. The 
state environmental agency, TCEQ, was the strongest institutional stakeholder with the 
Bull Hide Creek Clear Water Alliance serving as the most powerful stakeholder from the 
Bull Hide Creek community. Other stakeholders included McLennan County 
(represented by the Court of Commissioners), the Levi Water System and a few affected 
citizens who chose to remain semi-independent from the Alliance. Although the City of 
Hewitt was a direct beneficiary of the project, it delegated its stakeholder status to the 
City of Waco along with the other municipalities in the WMARSS. 
WMARSS was established in 2004 when the main sewer plant was acquired 
from the Brazos River Authority. According to the WMARSS web site 
(http://www.wmarss.com), it is “A joint wastewater treatment effort by the cities of 
Bellmead, Hewitt, Lacy Lakeview, Lorena, Robinson, Waco, and Woodway.” By 
combining resources into a single wastewater treatment organization, “WMARSS has 
helped to reduce the environmental impact of multiple wastewater treatment facilities 
and protect and preserve our natural resources. The regional system has also helped to 
reduce the costs associated with treatment, thereby assisting WMARSS participating 
cities in maintaining affordable rates for customers” (The Brazos River Authority, 2011). 
This emphasis on economies of scale was a persuading point Waco used when Hewitt 
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and Lorena were considering wastewater alternatives. However, there were no studies 
done comparing the costs and benefits of local, centralized vs. de-centralized treatment 
or alternative treatment methods plants such as bio-digesters, co-digestion or gasification 
or the use of emerging technologies to address the treatment problems. All decisions 
were based on the advice of city engineers who advocated a conventional, centralized 
plant consisting primarily of an collection system of underground pipes that would feed 
into a processing plant utilizing aerobic digestion in settling tanks, removal of sludge, 
and discharge of chemically treated effluent (Bartlett, 2007; Craig, 2002). 
Coincidentally, all municipalities used the same engineering firm. Despite the assertions 
of the WMARSS representatives that the plant would incorporate the latest technologies, 
the recommended design has been the standard since the late 19th century and the 
regulations are written and enforced for systems that provide for the management of 
waste, rather than a potential water resource (Venhuizen, 2010). 
Constructed in the early 1920’s, the main regional plant was originally the 
treatment plant for the City of Waco. Forty years later, in 1965, the General Manager for 
the Brazos River Authority introduced a new concept to his directors; Col. Walter Wells 
advocated the construction of a regional wastewater treatment plant that would utilize 
economies of scale to reduce regulatory and treatment costs for the municipalities in 
McLennan County. Regionalization of wastewater treatment was a new idea and it 
required significant political persuasion on the part of the Authority’s board to win the 
support of state officials at the Texas Water Development Board, The Texas Natural 
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Resources Conservation Commission, and members of the Waco City Council, to 
transfer municipal operations to the Brazos River Authority (Etnier et al., 2004). 
According to J.H. Kultgen, who was a member of the board at the time of the 
decision, among their concerns was the loss of financial control over the operations and 
the cost of building the supporting infrastructure (Kultgen, 1975). The possibility that 
sewage sludge, or effluent, would ever be a valued resource was not considered nor was 
the environmental impact of a concentrated disposal site. The objective of Col. Wells 
was to integrate and comprehensively manage all the water resources of the Brazos 
River basin. In 1971, a regional wastewater system was implemented ownership and 
operations of the Waco plant was transferred to the BRA (The Brazos River Authority, 
2006; WMARSS). In 1994, the Waco Area Metropolitan Regional Sewerage System 
was formed and the wastewater system was transferred to the quasi-public organization. 
This move freed up the financial and staff resources of the BRA for surface water supply 
management.  
The City of Waco owns 79.234% of the consortium and their representative has 
six votes on the advisory board, all the other cities have one vote and a proportionate 
percentage of treatment capacity (WMARSS, 2007). The city administrators of Hewitt, 
Robinson, Lorena, Lacy-Lakeview, Bellmead, and Woodway and the Assistant City 
Manager of Waco constitute the Advisory Board, with the Assistant City Manager of 
Waco serving as the board chair (WMARSS, 2007). Meetings of the Advisory Board are 
not open to the public and minutes are not available; their deliberations and decisions are 
unknown. 
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Hewitt joined the Waco Metropolitan Area Regional Sewerage System in 1995 at 
the invitation of WMARSS. The City of Hewitt accepted as they were seeking 
economies of scale in processing their waste, as well as additional treatment capacity 
and the reduction of administrative costs associated with regulatory compliance (HDR, 
2010b). The agreement involved collecting and sending their wastewater to the main 
regional treatment plant on the Brazos River via a system of lift stations and sewer force 
mains. As the Brazos plant approached allowed treatment capacity, Hewitt was forced to 
implement a development moratorium caused by the capped wastewater treatment 
capacity which directly impacted the development in the City (Doerr, 2008; United 
States Census, 2013). 
The City of Lorena joined WMARSS in 2007 in hopes of resolving multiple 
problems with their wastewater treatment plant through the assistance of the City of 
Waco. Inadequate planning, substandard materials, poor maintenance, and financial 
constraints had resulted in an aging, dilapidated infrastructure that was allowing 
infiltration of ground water (Lorena City Council, 2009; Lyon, 2010; Moran; Smith, 
2008a; J.B. Smith, 2009b). This resulted in the City exceeding the allowed 75% of its 
permitted treatment capacity and triggering the regulatory requirement that they begin 
planning for expansion (Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2012). Another 
concern was that if rainwater could seep in sewage could seep out (Lorena City Council, 
2009). 
Frequent fines from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality for 
exceeding capacity, dumping untreated sewage in their discharge waterway, poor 
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effluent quality, improper testing protocols, and poor, missing, or inadequate records 
suggested possible mismanagement (Texas Commision on Environmental Quality, 2010, 
p. 385:474). As part of the regulatory enforcement, Lorena signed an Agreed Order with 
TCEQ that stipulated Lorena would address the problems associated with the plant and 
join a regional wastewater consortium by February 2010, the expected completion date 
of the Bull Hide plant. According to Ms. Anna Dunbar, the regional director for TCEQ 
in Waco, this provision was included at the request of Lorena, not WMARSS (T.C.E.Q. 
Public hearing on the permit 2009). Yet John Moran and other would later use the 
Agreed Order to publicly justify Lorena’s participation in WMARSS, claiming TCEQ 
was forcing them into the consortium (Waco Metropolitan Planning Organization, 
2010). 
As a result of the constraints by TCEQ, the council was forced to pass a 
moratorium suspending the issuance of any additional sewer connections. This action 
resulted in numerous negative impacts on the community, similar to those being 
experienced by Hewitt (City of Lorena, 2009). Both cities sought to lift the moratoriums. 
In addition by sending their waste to a facility that would be constructed outside their 
city limits it would be possible to: maximize the amount of developable, taxable land, 
mitigate potentially offensive odors associated with sewage treatment, protect their local 
waterways, minimize potential spill risks, and reduce development costs by purchasing 
land in an undeveloped area. 
The City of Waco was looking at multiple benefits if Lorena would join the 
consortium. Publicly, they promoted the economic benefits of scale for all parties that 
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would result from regional wastewater treatment management and operations but they 
stood to gain disproportionately because they were the majority voting member in the 
consortium (Stem, 2007). Not only would they benefit financially directly and 
disproportionately (see Appendix I, contract with Lorena), they would also be able to 
acquire secondary benefits via preferential government subsidies on behalf of a regional 
entity through the EPA and other federal agencies. Profitable effluent sales to a local 
power plant would also benefit Waco (WMARSS; Wolfe & McGinn, 2005). By 
constructing an additional plant with expansion potential, Waco would also decrease the 
treatment demand on their main plant, allowing for development of their inner city and 
river corridor, ironically the consulting planners recommended that any development 
outside their city limits be limited due to the costs associated with expanding required 
city services (The Wallace Group, 2001). At the time of the recommendation, 
approximately 30% of land within the City was undeveloped. Because of the demand for 
development outside the City, city management decided a satellite plant would be a wise 
investment. After evaluating growth trends, six potential sites for a future satellite plant 
were identified in the southern part closer to Hewitt, Robinson, and Lorena (the high 
growth areas in the county) of the county by WMARSS (Ingram). Simultaneously, 
WMARSS began seeking federal funding to expand the aging main plant (Stem, 2007, p. 
278; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2012). 
Their first choice was a site located in the City of Robinson. The leaders of that 
city, however, were averse to a treatment facility in their municipality and the owner of 
the proposed site fought a successful political and legal battle causing City of Waco 
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administrators to consider alternative sites. Of the remaining possibilities, three sites 
were located in the extra-territorial jurisdiction (ETJ) of Waco and adjacent to the City 
of Lorena’s ETJ. Because of the proximity to Lorena, representatives from the City of 
Waco contacted the City of Lorena city manager and suggested that Lorena become a 
member of WMARSS (WMARSS).  
Although Lorena officials publicly acknowledged they were joining WMARSS 
for help in managing their wastewater and desired to move their treatment facility. Wiley 
Stem, the assistant city manager of Waco, emphasized the mutually beneficial aspect of 
the agreement. “We are not putting this here because Lorena’s system is in trouble. We 
are putting this here because Lorena is at capacity and so is the rest of the WMARSS 
system” (Ingram). Documents show the City of Waco had been planning to put in a 
wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) in or near Lorena for years before asking Lorena to 
join WMARSS. In fact, in 2006 and 2007, the City Manager of Waco testified before the 
United States Senate sub-committee on water resources stating the satellite plant would 
benefit the Waco metropolitan area and, in particular, the rapidly growing communities 
adjacent to I-35. “As opposed to expanding the central wastewater treatment located in a 
remote, downstream area, the expansion will be accomplished with “satellite” 
wastewater treatment plants that will be located in areas near the high growth corridors 
(Groth, 2007, p. 2). He was in Washington to request for federal funds for the project. 
Waco sought funding for the project citing that effluent would be reclaimed for 
multiple uses, freeing up surface water supplies. Federal funding for the project was 
officially opposed by the Bureau of Reclamation on the grounds that funding was not 
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available (Statement of larry todd, deputy commissioner bureau of reclamation on hr 
609, 2007; Statement of larry todd, deputy commissioner of the bureau of reclamation, 
2006). Funds were later received through the EPA from monies originating with the 
2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. 
The cities were opposed by a grass roots organization named the Bull Hide Creek 
Clearwater Alliance, the Levi Water System and three families that were aligned with 
the Alliance but retained individual standing for legal purposes: Mr. and Mrs. Felipe 
Reyna, Mr. and Mrs. John Brodine and Mrs. Edna Hughes and her family. The Levi 
Water System maintained their separateness throughout the process, but supported the 
Alliance by allowing them to use their community building, gave them access to their 
membership list and shared information with them. Like many grass roots movements, 
the formation of the opposition coalition was the direct result of what was perceived to 
be a failure on the part of local government to behave appropriately. Grass roots 
organizations are formed by concerned citizens who feel compelled to respond to a 
perceived threat; they are political and publicize their cause through the community in an 
effort to gain support and redress The term comes from the fact that grass roots 
movements grow spontaneously, naturally and without the support of established 
organizations, similar to the spreading of native, wild grass roots. 
In this case, the residents of the Bull Hide community felt a major decision 
affecting their community, their lives and their property had been made without their 
input and they reacted strongly. The filing for the permit and the community notification 
of this action took place at a meeting held at the local high school on Thursday, March 
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20, 2008. Upon learning that the development and planning for the wastewater treatment 
plant had been going on for years, attendees were shocked. The situation was made 
worse when the consultants presenting the proposal refused to answer questions. 
Immediately following the meeting, angy community members organized a meeting to 
be held at the local water company on the following Tuesday. 
Notification of the Tuesday meeting was disseminated through the community 
via direct personal contact, email or phone. This meeting was attended by over 100 
people who were confused, worried and uncertain. However, they quickly organized and 
by within two hours had a steering committee, a name, a membership list and a time and 
date for the next meeting. The “core” group (steering committee) would lead the 
opposition through the next 18 months. This group noticeably evolved in the 18 month 
period between the filing of the permit and the signing of the agreed settlement.  
One of the most difficult challenges facing the Alliance was determining who 
would lead. Judge and Mrs. Reyna, due to their standing in the community were asked to 
serve, and they accepted. Gary Penny, a quiet, non-confrontational man assumed the role 
of peaceful organizer. The Helpert brothers, Kevin and Keith, along with their brother-
in-law, Todd Christianson, actively and helped the Reyna’s effectively coordinate 
multiple tasks for over a year. As in all organizations, the primary leadership was 
supported by secondaries. People set up a web site, wrote press releases, organized fund 
raisers, did research, contacted elected political officials and educated non-affiliated 
members in the community about the issue. As the organization developed, the Bull 
Hide Creek Clearwater Alliance, and leadership, established legitimacy in the 
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community and among the other stakeholders, including the cities. The relative 
proximities of the municipalities can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Proximity of Lorena to the City of Waco and other WMARSS entities  
(All municipalities are located with McLennan County, Texas) 
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5.5. Bull Hide Creek 
According to the Handbook of Texas Online, Bull Hide creek:  
 
rises three miles south of Woodway in south central McLennan County (at 
31 23’ N, 97°01’W) and runs southeast for 19 miles to its mouth on the Brazos 
River, four miles east of Golinda in Falls County (at 31 28’ N, 97°15’W). The 
stream in intermittent in its upper reaches and has springs, pools and steady flows 
south of the proposed plant site. It was named for a bull hide that was hung on a 
tree by a hunter in the late 1800’s. The creek crosses flat to rolling prairie with 
locally steep slopes, surfaced by expansive clays and clay loams that support 
juniper, oak, mesquite, and grasses in its upper and middle reaches and water 
tolerant hardwoods and conifers downstream (Texas State Historical Association, 
1999). Figure 3 shows the area of the creek that will receive the discharge from 
the wastewater treatment plant. This picture was taken during the winter drought 
and the limestone floor and banks of the creek are visible. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Bull Hide Creek at Cooksey Lane, February 24, 2009 
(Looking downstream toward the plant site from Cooksey Lane during a dry period.) 
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The creek, according to an environmental assessment conducted by James 
Miertschin and Associates (the Austin engineering firm filing the permit on behalf of 
WMARSS), is “entirely characteristic of the Blackland Prairie” (James Miertschin and 
Associates & Paul Price Aquatic Ecology, 2007). In close proximity to the proposed 
plant, on the Warren Farm across the creek from the plant site, lies an undisturbed 
section of Blackland Prairie which supports extensive native wildlife and flora. 
According a representative of the Native Prairies Association of Texas, who visited the 
site, less than 3,000 acres of undisturbed Blackland Prairie remain out of an original 
12,000,000. One of the concerns of the Warren family was that WMARSS was not only 
unaware of this unique ecological system; they planned on destroying a large section of 
it in the process of laying pipe to the City of Lorena. When the large Warren family 
protested, both verbally and in writing to the City of Waco, they were told, in writing, 
that if they did not cooperate, the land would be condemned through eminent domain, 
leading them to seek legal counsel. Ultimately, after being advised by their attorney that 
they could not prevail, the sold three acres of their native prairie land for an easement; a 
large section of the prairie was disturbed when the land was excavated for the sewer pipe 
and used for equipment storage. It was not restorated. A contributing factor to the 
family’s strong opposition to the plant was the fact that they had been approached by 
McLennan County a few months before the filing of the permit and asked to donate land 
needed to upgrade an old iron bridge crossing Cooksey Lane. Although this upgrade was 
necessary to carry the weight of the trucks that would be hauling sludge from the Bull 
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Hide plant, this fact was never shared with the Warren’s. The family was furious when it 
was discovered they had been deceived into donating land that they felt would have a 
negative impact on their family farm. They attempted to cancel the donation, but 
ownership of the land had already been transferred to the county (Bull Hide Creek Clear 
Water Alliance, 2008).  
The creek is a second order stream in the vicinity of the proposed plant with 
springs providing pools in most conditions except extreme drought. At the Cooksey 
Lane crossing, Austin Chalk limestone is exposed. About a mile downstream the creek 
narrows just below the proposed plant site in response to changing geology and at this 
point there is a low water dam that has created a swimming and fishing hole with heavy 
riparian vegetation. Below the dam, the creek bed narrows, becomes deeper and supports 
an extensive ecosystem that contains what the state considers to be “a highly rated 
aquatic life” (James Miertschin and Associates & Paul Price Aquatic Ecology, 2007). 
The creek’s ecosystem supports cougars, bobcats, fox, Great Horned owls, bass, perch, 
vultures, blue birds, and numerous migrating species in the fall and spring. 
The creek is easily accessible in the stretch between Cooksey Lane and 
Rosenthal Parkway from a narrow, paved, creek side road. Easy access due to limited 
fencing, an iron bridge with a historical marker and well, maintained, 19th century 
cemetery make this stretch a popular destination and gathering spot in the summer for 
cycling enthusiasts, hikers, picnickers, and waders (Garrett, 2003). The quiet, heavily 
wooded, rural environment attracts bird-watchers, individuals seeking solitude, and 
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families on the traditional, Sunday afternoon drive who wish to spend quiet time in the 
country. 
The negotiated settlement provides that 40 acres of the 243 will be dedicated for 
99 years to a future park with community recreational facilities (see Appendix G, page 
3). According to the county commissioner, Kelly Snell, the park will serve as a “county 
precinct park” and be located upstream from the wastewater treatment plant (Gonzalez, 
2009). It is part of the 2010 county wide master park plan adopted by the 
commissioner’s court and recommends a park that will include a sports complex, a 
playground, concession stands, recreational vehicle spaces, a fishing area, horseback 
trails, hike and bike trails, a water sports area, camping facilities, and picnic areas 
(Mundo and Associates, 2010). Although the Bull Hide site was not identified as the 
future park in the plan, the 40 acres has been designated. 
A recreational area adjacent to the creek was insisted upon by stakeholders who 
were concerned that the plant site would be used as a future regional landfill. This 
possibility was conveyed to the author by the staff member at the Heart of Texas Council 
of Governments in charge of regional solid waste planning but the City of Waco denied 
the allegation on the grounds they projected 15 years remaining space in their landfill. 
An employee in the solid waste division of TCEQ, however, told the author that while 
Waco had 15 years capacity remaining in 2009, the six county region was expected to 
reach landfill capacity before 2018 (Mann, 2008). 
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Table 1. Events Pertaining to the Bull Hide Creek Wastewater Treatment Plant 
Date Event 
February 13, 2007 
Application for a permit for Lorena to discharge effluent into Bull 
Hide creek (WQ0014782001) and construct a new wastewater 
treatment plant 
 
 
June 16, 2007 Resolution by the City Council of Lorena agreeing to construct at 
WWTP near Bull Hide Creek, the last municipality to do so 
 
 
July 3, 2007 
Lorena and WMARSS sign an Interlocal Cooperation Agreement 
conveying the Lorena WWTP and existing operating permit to 
WMARSS and the terms of the agreement 
 
 
September 10, 2007 
Contract between the City of Waco, representing WMARSS, and 
Mrs. Dorothy Smith for a 90 day purchase option on 235 acres of 
land 
 
 
February 5, 2008 
Agreed Order stipulating Lorena will repair deficiencies in their 
plant, remove contaminants from the discharge waterway, file 
missing reports, and divert all wastewater to the new regional 
wastewater plant 
 
 
March 14, 2008 Smith property closed on, letters to affected land owners mailed 
out informing them of meeting on March 20, 2008 
 
 
March 20, 2008 
First permit withdrawn (WQ0014782001) Second permit 
(WQ0014889001) filed (11:28 A.M.), meeting with affected land 
owners at the Lorena High School later that night 
 
 
April 1, 2008 Complaint filed with the EPA concerning hazardous materials at 
Bull Hide plant site. Estimated cost of removal, $115,000 
 
 
May 20, 2008 
Wiley Stem, Chairman of the WMARSS advisory board, requests 
meeting with Felipe Reyna in an email. "The WMARSS staff 
would appreciate an opportunity to meet with you and discuss 
your concerns relative to the Bullhide Treatment Plant. Since we 
have never had the opportunity to directly provide you any 
information about this project…" 
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Table 1, continued 
Date Event 
June 10, 2008 
Representatives from the City of Lorena, the City of Waco and the 
Bull Hide Creek Clearwater Alliance meet in Rep. Doc 
Anderson's office with WMARSS representatives at the request of 
Rep. Anderson. Not all stakeholders are included. 
 
 
August 5, 2008 
Official request filed with TCEQ for public meeting and contested 
case hearing for the application of Permit WQ0014889001 by 
Felipe and Cheryl Reyna 
 
 
September 17, 2009 
The Memorandum of Agreement of Principle between WMARSS 
and the stakeholders is signed. This negotiated settlement 
addressed the concerns of the stakeholder 
 
 
January 6, 2010 
Permit WQ0014889001 issued to discharge effluent from Bull 
Hide Creek WWTP 
 
 
February 2, 2012 
Bull Hide plant online, Lorena plant converted to collection 
facility 
  
April 1, 2012 
Engineers for the Bull Hide plant publish a paper detailing 
problems with the plant stating: it is underutilized by over a 
million gallons per day causing operating and treatment problems, 
the plant is polluting the creek with nutrients, there were 
maintenance problems in the Lorena plant that were not addressed, 
improper testing protocols by the City of Lorena resulted in 
inaccurate reporting and conclusions, the design for the plant was 
based on a model that did not allow for dynamic inflow 
conditions, sludge treatment is a problem, and there are problems 
controlling odor and bacteria (Paul Wood P.E., 2102). This report 
was not shared with stakeholders. 
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6. FINDINGS 
 
In the permitting process pertaining to of the Bull Hide Creek wastewater 
treatment plant multiple issues were present which were influenced by risk perception. 
The perceived risk associated with the filing and issuance of permit WQ001488900 was 
a present and influential, yet unidentified factor, which affected the process. Risk 
perception was developed, enhanced, amplified, mitigated, and attenuated through the 
utilization of three intervening variables: resources, risk communication and trust. This 
section discusses how. 
6.1. The Role of Resources 
In this case, as in so many conflicts, the resources stakeholders had access to, and 
how they were used, were critical to accomplishing the desired objectives. There were 
two main stakeholder groups, those aligned with the BHCCWA and those aligned with 
the WMARSS entities. Strong opposition mobilized by the stakeholders against the Bull 
Hide plant was made possible by accessing and utilizing resources which were used for 
two main strategic objectives. The first objective was to consume resources of 
WMARSS, the City of Lorena, and the City of Waco. By causing WMARSS to spend 
use resources to fight a battle, the tangible and intangible costs to WMARSS would rise. 
The leadership felt that when the costs rose sufficiently, WMARSS would be more 
inclined to negotiate, leading to the second strategic objective. This was identified as 
getting the WMARSS entities into a negotiating situation that would result in an agreed 
settlement. WMARSS entities wished to expedite the permitting process to bring the 
 57 
 
 
plant online as soon as possible. Schattschneider (1983) has observed, competition for 
resources is not only a source of conflict but competition for resources may escalate with 
continued conflict. Competition for resources played an integral role and contributed to 
the conflict surrounding the permitting of the plant. 
This conflict was highly emotional and contentious. Although the stakeholders 
aligned with the BHCCWA wanted to stop the construction of the plant, most 
individuals believed it was highly unlikely this could be accomplished. A negotiated 
settlement was preferable to a protracted legal battle that would consume more resources 
than they had or believed they could obtain. This was not as critical an issue for the 
WMARSS entities as not only did their combined resources far exceed those of the 
opposition, they were more experienced in using them to achieve desired policy 
implementation. However, both sides were aware that they were competing for political 
and social influence. 
Each side wanted to avoid a long, drawn out battle but for different reasons. 
Waco was well aware that time “was not their friend” because it would delay 
construction of the plant, raising costs significantly. This position was based on the 
knowledge that delays are costly for many reasons: interim financing costs may increase, 
costs to purchase easements may increase, inflation may affect the cost of materials, 
actual construction costs will rise due to extended fixed costs (employees, buildings, 
insurance, utilities, payroll, equipment) but delayed revenue, delays may  require 
expensive rebidding processes, top sub-contractors may take on other projects, there may 
be unrecoverable opportunity costs, possible legal fees related to hearings and litigation, 
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and related intangible costs such as loss of momentum or key parties. Time is, literally, 
money (Harder, 2002; Scott, 1993) 
Opponents of the permit for the plant took different positions. Encouraged by 
two prominent lawyers (Texas 10th District Court of Appeals Justice Felipe Reyna and 
his wife Cheryl), the leadership of the Alliance deliberately delayed negotiations 
intentionally whenever possible to raise WMARSS costs. They consistently held their 
public position there would be no compromise, which put additional temporal pressures 
on WMARSS creating anxiety and increasing perceived risk. Privately, core members of 
the Alliance discussed the disparity in resources with other opposition stakeholders, and 
what they would be willing to compromise on when resources became scarce. When 
resources dwindled, grass roots opponents “threw in the towel” because they couldn’t 
continue the fight, a typical outcome in environmental conflicts (The Yale Law School, 
2013). 
The Levi water supply company and other individual stakeholders supported the 
Alliance’s leadership position. Although the water company, Charlie Montgomery, Mr. 
Dewey Jackson, and his mother, Mrs. Edna Hughes, were given standing at a procedural 
hearing, they did not have the financial or emotional resources to maintain a separate 
legal conflict with the City of Waco. As a result, all the stakeholders worked together to 
obtain and employ the same legal firm and consultant. This proved to be an advantage 
for the City of Waco, as they were able to direct their efforts at one primary opponent 
and minimize the points of conflict. 
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Individuals, government agencies, and institutions prefer to function in the 
absence of conflict as it consumes resources, and threatens a system’s stability. Conflict, 
however, may provide a stimulus for fundamental or incremental change. Due to its very 
nature, conflict results in the exercise of power as well as an opportunity for opposing 
groups to acquire additional power In the pursuit of power, institutions, as well as 
individuals, are assumed to rationally consider the costs and benefits associated with the 
use of resources in the pursuit of, and acquisition of, power. It is, however, recognized 
that power may not only be a means to an end, but an end in itself. 
6.1.1. The Role of Power 
Power is a critically important element in policy development and risk 
perception. In any conflict, the party that possesses power will be able to limit who can 
participate in the process, who has access to the media, what negotiating structures are 
adopted, and who is considered to be a credible participant; in essence, strategically 
controlling the conflict, expansion of the conflict, and the associated perceived risk. The 
weaker party in a conflict can increase their power by recruiting others to their side, 
thereby widening the conflict and making it more difficult for the stronger party to 
dominate and control the participants involved in the conflict (Schattschneider, 1983). 
This may include neutral parties, such as media representatives, who serve as 
intermediary recruiters. With the expansion of the conflict, the power balance, and 
relative risk perception, may shift, resulting in re-evaluation, re-organization, and 
renewed negotiations. 
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Early in the planning process, the City of Waco exercised their legitimate power 
as the largest political entity in the area by threatening the owner of the land they wished 
to acquire for the wastewater treatment plant. Mrs. Smith, an elderly widow had owned a 
gas station with her husband in Waco for decades but it had been closed for many years. 
The couple had stored petroleum waste products and old tires on the land out of 
convenience; the majority of the materials were put there prior to the establishment of 
environmental regulations or hazardous waste dumps. Knowing the materials were there, 
the City used them to pressure Mrs. Smith into selling her land by giving her two 
choices. Either she could sell the land to the City of Waco or they would contact the 
regulatory agency in charge of illegal dumps and hazardous waste. Being in poor health, 
with dwindling funds, and limited access to supporting friends and family, Mrs. Smith 
sold her land to the City of Waco under duress, to attenuate her perceived risk as much 
as possible, responding to the use of coercive power on the part of the City of Waco . 
Shortly after acquiring the land from Mrs. Smith, an anonymous tip was submitted to the 
EPA and the City was notified that regulatory action was being taken concerning the 
hazardous materials. Although the City officially stated they had been unaware 
hazardous materials were on the land, records obtained by the BHCCWA through open 
records requests confirmed this was not the case; they mentioned the debris in their 
correspondence with Mrs. Smith (Kultgen, 2008a). 
Members of the Alliance notified the reporter covering the story and the local 
paper did a major story reporting the City of Waco expected to spend over $100,000 
cleaning up the Smith property (J.B. Smith, 2009a). Despite an intense effort by the City 
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of Waco to determine who had notified the EPA or called the reporter, they were never 
able to identify the source. One of the core leaders of the Alliance confidentially 
confirmed it was one of their members but because he had not been arrested by the City 
of Waco for trespassing (pictures documenting the waste were provided to the EPA), 
they were confident his identity was unknown. Local television stations picked up the 
story and numerous negative comments about the City of Waco were received by the 
media via letters to the editor and electronic postings-effectively expanding the referent 
power of the Alliance.  
The members of the Bull Hide Creek Clear Water Alliance were aware of the 
power imbalance and utilized various compensatory tactics. As the most visible and 
powerful opposition stakeholder, this grassroots organization exercised legitimate, 
coercive, reward, and expert power throughout the conflict. As the largest group they 
possessed the greatest combined resources which gave them legitimate power as the 
leader of the stakeholders. They were also able to employ the use of reward power by 
promising political support to the involved politicians. By publicizing the combined 
stakeholder’s opposition through press conferences, letter writing campaigns, fund 
raising events, protests at city council meetings, soliciting the support of public officials, 
and television interviews, they utilized referent power to appeal to the public’s sense of 
fairness to strengthen their position. This was done by emphasizing: 
 the decision had been made without input from the landowners in the area, 
 there would be adverse effects to the water quality of the creek, 
 Waco had a reputation for being fined for sewage spills, 
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 the landowners would not benefit in any way from the treatment plant, 
 it was a poor economic decision for Lorena but it would benefit the City of 
Waco, 
 representatives of the City of Waco and the City of Lorena had been deceptive by 
withholding information and lying to the press and stakeholders, and 
 this was a classic fight between the big, bad guy and the little average little guy. 
The Alliance leadership exercised coercive power in numerous ways; at times 
very public, at other times less obvious. The most obvious coercive power use was to 
continually threaten the City of Waco and other WMARSS entities with a protracted 
legal fight in public. Individual members of the Alliance wrote angry letters to the editor 
of the local newspaper, the Waco Tribune-Herald and the state regulatory agency 
(TCEQ), demanded a contentious public hearing attended by hundreds, and gave many 
interviews with the media. Coercive power was also utilized in private with phone calls, 
emails, texts, and at closed meetings. For example, at a tense meeting arranged by the 
local state representative, “Doc” Anderson, Waco’s assistant city manager was told by 
Mrs. Felipe Reyna that she would “fight them to the day she died” and was willing to 
spend considerable money in the process (WMARSS representatives & BHCCWA 
representatives, 2008). 
Not so obvious threats utilizing coercive power came by raising public fears 
(perceived risk) and appealing to community emotions through impassioned letters to the 
editor campaigns, professional videos, websites, a facebook page, community fund 
raisers, and the distribution of satirical posters throughout the area. Waco’s assistant city 
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manager was directly threatened by Alliance leadership with a extensive legal battle in a 
private meeting with political representatives (WMARSS representatives & BHCCWA 
representatives, 2008). Being willing, and able, to use coercive power to publicly 
threaten the City of Waco and other WMARSS entities with costly litigation, possible 
loss of funding, and loss of face gave the Alliance a positional advantage over 
WMARSS as WMARSS was unwilling to publicly threaten the Alliance. 
Like coercive and legitimate power, referent power is a social construct. By 
necessity, people trust, and defer, to “experts” because it is not possible to seek out, 
acquire and process infinite information pertaining to common activities. But what 
constitutes an expert? An expert can be defined in various ways. One of the best 
definitions is from Schattschneider (Schattschneider, 1983, p. xvi): “…an expert is a 
person who chooses to be ignorant about many things so he may know all about one”. 
Every day, people are required to place confidence in pharmacists, surgeons, pilots, bank 
clerks, engineers, plumbers, technicians, lawyers, and others more knowledgeable than 
them (Schattschneider, 1983). 
Not only do people rely on the opinions of experts when making decisions in 
their private lives, they often seek the security proffered by those they trust in positions 
of power in social or political institutions when confronted with uncertainty or risk 
(Cheng, 2009). An expert may not understand the complexity of the situation or the 
personal vagaries pertaining to the problem at hand, but people will defer to an expert if 
they trust him, or her (Schattschneider, 1983). Early in the conflict, members of the 
Alliance sought out and deferred to “experts” they trusted. Daryl Knowles, a wastewater 
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instructor at the local technical college was hired to examine the permit and challenge 
the technologies, design specifications, treatment parameters, and technically based local 
limits (TBLLs). Despite reservations about his competency, expressed privately to this 
researcher and based on his physical appearance and dress, the group selected Mr. 
Knowles over other applicants because of his geographic accessibility, lower fee, and the 
recommendation of their legal firm. The recommendation of their attorney, whom they 
trusted, was clearly the most important factor. If trust is present, expert power is 
enhanced and perceived risk is attenuated (Jenkin, 2006). In this instance, the expressed 
reservations pertaining to his competency may have indicated some individuals felt his 
selection was risky. 
At times, multiple types of power were used simultaneously. For example, the 
Levi Water Supply used both coercive and legitimate power when they challenged 
WMARSS at the public hearing. They reminded TCEQ representatives that TCEQ 
regulations specifically forbid the placing of a well “within 300 feet of a ditch containing 
waste from sewage treatment systems” and the Levi water system had a well within 75 
feet of the creek (Public hearing on the permit no. Wq0014889001, 2008). Waco used a 
combination of legitimate and expert power when they used a well-known 
environmental consulting firm, James Miertschin and Associates of Austin, Texas to 
prepare the environmental component of the report and answer questions from TCEQ 
pertaining to the environmental impact on the creek (James Miertschin and Associates, 
2008). The Alliance used a combination of expert and legitimate power during the public 
hearing when their expert, Daryl Knowles, challenged the efficacy of the proposed 
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treatment on behalf of the combined opposition stakeholders (Public hearing on the 
permit no. Wq0014889001, 2008). 
Although the BHCCWA leadership never directly mentioned how the power 
balance and flow changed during the conflict, they consciously strategized on how to 
deal with Waco’s power. At times, tactical strategies were direct and formal (such as 
press conferences). At other times, they were informal, collaborative, and discreet. They 
met privately with county commissioners, representatives, and WMARSS officials. They 
collaborated with, and recruited, supporters from environmental organizations and the 
local University (Texas Prairie Association and Baylor Department of Environmental 
Sciences), as well as, former residents of the area and members of other groups who had 
environmental conflicts with the City of Waco (The Texas Association of Dairymen). 
Alliance members also worked together to set up a web site, research information, obtain 
information through Open Records requests pertaining to Waco’s environmental 
violations, to attend bid openings for the design and construction of the plant, and set up 
various committees (publicity, fundraising, legal and technical) which increased their 
group cohesiveness. Because the Alliance was able to preserve cohesiveness they were 
able to maintain sufficient power which directly influenced their ability to acquire 
money. 
6.1.2. The Role of Money  
Money is used by individuals, institutions and groups to acquire and enhance 
culturally based positional power, enhance egos, influence others, and manipulate 
perceived risk. For example, it can be used to buy advertising, divert resources, retain 
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legal assistance, access expertise, send out information or misinformation (propaganda), 
challenge the legitimacy of information released by other stakeholders, reward 
compliance, recruit and acquire the support of others, or punish. In addition, it can be 
used directly or indirectly in exchange for tangible or intangible items. 
The City of Waco and WMARSS had significant monetary resources that dwarfed 
those of the Bull Hide Alliance and aligned stakeholders. For example, the wastewater 
budget for the City of Waco 2008-2009 showed wastewater revenues of over $20 million 
(City of Waco finance department, 2009, p. 94). Compare this to a budget of less than 
$20,000 acquired through: garage sales, personal contributions, dedicated percentages 
from a few small, local horse shows, passing the hat at meetings, and dances at the local 
VFW hall. The sheer magnitude of the difference in financial resources, and the amount 
that WMARSS could devote to winning the conflict, presented a major risk to the 
Alliance; the core leadership felt they could not raise the funds necessary to sustain a 
protracted fight and they consistently conveyed to their members that money was 
necessary to successfully fight the permit. 
WMARSS had access to public funds that could be spent without the approval of 
elected officials or the voting public. The city managers who represented their entities on 
the WMARSS board are appointed by the respective city councils. In this case, the 
majority of the members fully supported their city managers’ expenditures, with one 
exception. Robert Braswell, a representative on the Lorena City Council repeatedly 
challenged John Moran’s reports and spending recommendations to the council. 
Although he drew attention to discrepancies in bids and actual costs, without the support 
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of other council members, his complaints were not included in the council minutes. It is 
possible that this was due to the fact the decision to construct the plant had already been 
made years earlier in private work sessions and his objections were moot. Although 
members of the Alliance attended both Lorena and Hewitt Council meetings and gave 
public comments objecting to the expenditures of public funds for the construction of the 
Bull Hide plant, the councils politely ignored them. It was postulated they were ignored 
because they were not eligible to vote in either city. 
Another financial factor was that WMARSS entities could utilize professional in 
house legal, clerical, environmental and technical experts without incurring additional 
expenses or opportunity costs; the Alliance was required to pay for these services. 
Because WMARSS had these in-house services, they were effectively able to attenuate 
their perceived risk. 
In contrast, the Alliance and the Levi Water Supply were accountable to their 
members for how the funds were spent. Because funds were critically low, 
disagreements as to how they should be spent were frequent. Leaders withheld financial 
information from the group to avoid dissent among the members for not only did the 
leadership consider the financial inequality an external threat, they recognized it had the 
potential to become in internal problem as well. 
To compensate for financial disparities, the Alliance strategically drained financial 
resources of WMARSS by using both political and social influence, regulatory 
requirements of TCEQ, forcing public hearings, requesting a state ordered administrative 
hearing, challenging the validity of WMARSS expert’s reports, and intentionally “being 
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a thorn in the side” of all possible public officials. Despite the gross difference in 
financial resources, these Alliance tactics had an impact on WMARSS which was 
perceived as increased risk and anyone identified as being associated with the Alliance 
was perceived as a risk to the project. Approximately mid-way through the process, I 
sent a request for permission to attend a WMARSS meeting to the Assistant Waco City 
Manager, Wiley Stem. His surprising response was, “No, not only no but, hell no. 
You’ve cost us over a million dollars.” His comment supported the observation that, in 
this case, money was a strong variable, both amplifying and attenuating risk perception. 
6.1.3. The Role of Social Influence 
 
Social influence was exercised discreetly, and competitively, by both sides to 
amplify and attenuate perceived risk. The most obvious use of social influence was the 
successful recruitment of the publisher, and the editor, of the Waco Tribune-Herald by 
the City of Waco to support their position. Although all the articles pertaining to the 
conflict in the news sections of the paper met journalist standards for truthfulness, 
accuracy, objectivity and fairness, editorials were written supporting WMARSS. The 
first editorial emphasized that great care had been taken to protect the creek and the 
importance of the plant to the growing communities of WMARSS, effectively 
communicating low risk ("Bull hide," 2008). An unexpected consequence of this was the 
refusal of the Waco paper to accept advertising from the Alliance. A number of people 
expressed frustration and concern as a result of the paper’s actions. As a result of the 
newspaper’s refusal to carry advertising opposing the plant, various members of the 
Alliance felt they were deliberately being denied news coverage towards the end of the 
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conflict. However, this may be attributed to the “short life” of stories dealing with public 
concerns. It is a documented phenomenon the public gets bored with media coverage of 
events after about two weeks of coverage unless interest is created by loud, public 
conflict, new information, related stories, or changes in public opinion (Peters & 
Hogwood, 1985; Sides, 2012). The Bull Hide creek WWTP story received coverage 
from March 21, 2008 through February 10, 2012, far beyond what could have been 
expected. 
Members of the Alliance sought out personal friends and family who could be 
recruited “for the cause.” Letters were written to TCEQ protesting the permit 
application, contesting the validity of the information it contained, sharing personal 
stories of childhood memories, and family histories. Other members appealed to 
powerful relatives and acquaintances. Ms. Hal Pledger publicly and angrily told Wiley 
Stem (the Assistant City Manager of Waco) one of her cousins had been the Chairman of 
the Texas Water Development Board and that he was extremely unhappy with Waco’s 
actions (Morales, 2011). She then confronted Mr. Stem with a book on Mr. Beecheral, 
Jr. and asked, “Do you know who this is? He’s my cousin and his wife grew up on Bull 
Hide Creek.” Mr. Stem politely, and in a low voice, replied, “I know who he is, I’ve 
been to his ranch” (WMARSS representatives & BHCCWA representatives, 2008). Mr. 
Beecheral subsequently made numerous phone calls to influential members in the water 
community expressing concern over the plant. These concerns resulted in phone calls to 
City of Waco administrators and effectively raised WMARSS’ level of perceived risk 
that the plant may not be permitted. 
 70 
 
 
Another member of the Alliance recruited a well-known local engineer who 
shared his knowledge of the historical and current wastewater and environmental 
problems Waco was struggling with at an Alliance meeting; his comments were then 
shared via mass emails. Still another member recruited a retired high level TCEQ 
employee to explain regulatory procedures and rules. Both of these speakers 
simultaneously increased and decreased the perceived risk. People who previously had 
paid no attention to media reports of Waco sewage spills now worried about what would 
happen to their creek if WMARSS discharged sewage effluent into it (increasing their 
perceived risk). However, their conversations revealed they felt Waco’s history of 
problems and enforcement actions, including a 5 million gallon raw sewage spill, would 
present an opportunity to call for increased restrictions on the proposed plant which 
attenuated their perceived risk (Smith, 2008b). 
Similarly, the audience listening to the former regulator was initially discouraged 
by his presentation because they were bluntly told WMARSS had experience and 
substantial resources, resulting in increased risk perception. Various members publicly 
expressed that it was not possible to win in a fight with Waco. However, during the 
question and answer period, Alliance members were told they could capitalize on the 
procedural structure of the permitting process and delay the issuance of the permit, 
leading to a commitment to acquire more resources and capitalize on regulatory 
processes that protected public interests. This led to a discussion on the upcoming public 
hearing, the plans for the SOAH and a possible lawsuit in an Austin District Court, 
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which improved morale and decreased risk perception (Bull Hide Creek Clear Water 
Alliance, 2008). 
6.1.4. The Role of Political Influence 
Both major stakeholders in the Bull Hide Creek Wastewater plant controversy 
used their political influence to amplify and attenuate risk perception by recruiting 
political actors. Some of these actors were elected politicians; others were individuals 
who were active in local politics. The most striking example of the use of political 
influence was the resolution passed by the McLennan County Commissioners Court 
opposing the plant on June 30, 2009 with only two dissenting votes. Commissioner 
Kelly Snell introduced the resolution because he felt the residents in the Bull Hide creek 
area had been left out of the political process. Lester Gibson, a commissioner voting for 
the resolution told a local reporter, “There was not a complete discussion of that the 
entire impact of this was going to be and I’m learning more now than what has ever been 
disclosed to us.” Ironically, representatives of WMARSS, the mayor of Waco, and the 
city manager of Hewitt strongly objected to being excluded from the court’s decision to 
issue the resolution or being invited to the meeting where it was introduced and passed. 
Charges of political influence peddling were made and the County Judge made it clear 
that there could be political retaliation toward the county by the WMARSS entities as a 
result (Dennis, 2009). Retaliation came, but it was in the form of a local editorial in the 
Sunday paper strongly condemning the Commissioner’s action. “How nice of McLennan 
County commissioners to awaken, Rip Van Winkle-like and take an interest in complex 
affairs that have occupied others for years” wrote the editor. In addition, “if 
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commissioners had wanted to learn more, they could have walked two blocks over to 
City Hall (sic) or picked up a phone.” The editorial objected to Mr. Snell’s comments 
that “there needs to be better communications about everything that’s going on with this 
project” and his suggestion that a joint work session with all the stakeholders would be 
productive. The editorial concluded by praising two members of the commissioner’s 
court for voting against “this probably irrelevant, Johnny-come-lately resolution” 
(Dennis, 2009). The majority of the comments pertaining to these two articles on the 
Internet supported the resolution and the opponents of the Bull Hide plant. Informal 
conversations with Alliance members indicated that this effective use of political 
influence dramatically decreased their perceived risk. 
Justice Felipe Reyna and his wife exercised their political influence to increase 
the perceived risk to WMARSS. They spent countless hours contacting active 
Republican Party members, and elected officials, soliciting their support for the 
Alliance. Their first success was the meeting Waco state legislator, Doc Anderson set up 
in his office between the adversaries. WMARSS representatives reluctantly attended the 
meeting but did so due to Doc’s status . The Reynas were also successful in recruiting 
state senator Kip Averitt, whose district included Bull Hide creek.  
Throughout the conflict, Waco and the WMARSS entities used limited political 
influence.  The most notable was at the public hearing on September 18, 2009. This 
meeting was attended by hundreds of people and held at the Lorena High School 
Performing Arts Center. City council members from Hewitt, Lorena, Woodway, Waco, 
and other WMARSS entities made numerous public comments to TCEQ moderators 
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emphasizing that not only did their communities need the plant, issuance of the permit 
would pose little, or no risk, to the hosting community or receiving waterway. At times 
their comments were met with loud opposition due to the presence of the people 
opposing the plant. As an observer, the dichotomy between the “suits of the politicians” 
and the “boots and jeans” of the rural residents was striking. The politicians were clearly 
more poised and confident, but they were outnumbered by those who felt their 
community, homes, and way of life was at risk if the permit was issued. 
6.2. The Role of Risk Communication 
The risks associated with building, or not building, the wastewater treatment 
plant were communicated through various sources, perceived, interpreted, amplified or 
attenuated, and responded to. This process was iterative and dynamic as the responses 
themselves were interpreted and responded to-thus contributing to subsequent 
amplification or attenuation. Eventually, the “ripple effects” dampened as risks on both 
sides reached acceptable levels and the intensity of the conflict decreased. 
As it has been noted, the cities of Waco, Hewitt, and Lorena used their influence 
to gain access to the newspaper owners (Waco Tribune-Herald). Editorials were written 
minimizing the risks of the plant to the creek but emphasizing the risks to the general 
community if the permit was denied. Based on letters to the editors, this resulted in 
community support for the project from unaffected county residents. In response, 
Alliance activists increased their efforts resulting in more coverage of the conflict in the 
news section of the paper. Based on the published letters to the editors and posted online 
comments pertaining to the online newspaper articles, support for the Alliance from 
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unaffected county residents increased. This may have been partially due to the 
historically strong distrust for Waco found in the surrounding communities. 
6.3. The Role of Trust 
Trust is difficult to establish and easily lost, yet it is a necessary condition of life 
that people trust others. This critically important aspect of human relationships affects 
risk perception, public policy development, negotiations associated with public policy, 
and implementation of public policies. Ancient cultural texts contain references to the 
value of trust and contemporary negotiating theories prominently emphasize the 
importance of trust in relationships (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991). Specifically, when 
trust in the level of expertise, the morality and the ethics of the other party, or parties, is 
present, there is a greater probability that mutually beneficial transactions, and 
agreements can be reached more efficiently than when it is absent or diminished 
(Cvetkovich & Lofstedt, 1999, p. xii). 
In the past, the siting and construction of waste disposal facilities in Waco was a 
decision made by authoritarian decision makers; public opinion, local impacts, and 
potential risks were irrelevant with the result being a profound lack of trust on the part of 
the public. Primarily as the result of large environmental disasters, the public demands, 
and has been legally allowed, a larger voice in the siting of waste facilities. When there 
is a high level of trust afforded to those involved in the project planning and 
implementation, positive outcomes are more likely because of the lower perceived risk. 
In this case, trust was absent from the beginning and perceived risk on the part of the 
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Bull Hide residents was high. Had their been no perceived risk, there would not have 
been opposition to the proposed plant. 
The lack of trust between the WMARSS and stakeholders opposed to the sewer 
project was a frequently mentioned topic. One of the most outspoken members of the 
Alliance, Justice Felipe Reyna of the Texas 10th Court of Appeals, repeatedly accused 
Waco of being unethical and untrustworthy (“lying deceitful, hypocritical scoundrels”) 
and others repeated the same charge that Waco could not be trusted (Doerr, 2008;"City's 
key concession's on Bull Hide creek," 2008). The following comments were typical of 
those found online and indicate strong perceived risk and lack of trust. All comments are 
from letters to the editor of the Waco Tribune-Herald. Spelling and grammar are as in 
the original. 
April 13, 2008  
Writer #1 
I wonder if there is a more sinister plan here by the City of Waco. If you 
have not noticed pay close attention because over the past 10+ years the City of 
Waco has pushed its greedy fingers out to every middle to upscale neighborhood 
from China Spring, to McGregor, to Speegleville, with future plans to annex 
parts of Chalk Bluff. I don’t know the answers but I will pose these questions. 
Would this City owned property allow Waco to begin annexing from there or 
make it easier to move their City limits out to that area because they already own 
the land? And, would that land give them an ETJ? If this gives Waco priority on 
any front then Cities beware.  
 
Writer #2 
We heard how the sewer was going to be put by Big Creek Construction, 
but Big Creek nixed that. WE heard that it was going to be placed close to Larry 
Groth’s home place, and he nixed that. Now they bought 234 acres that was not 
for sale, closed on it, then told people about it two weeks after closing. Talk 
about “dirty dog tricks” and “good ole boy system,” this project is the epitome. 
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We will do everything we can to stop it. If not, I will make it my mission in life 
to try & sue the city of Waco and all the others for no less than $750 million. The 
city of Waco has a lot of other places in industrial areas, not residential, where 
this could be put. Why not over by Lipsitz Recycling on Loop 340 and use the 
state easement there? Our location is a horrendous idea. 
 
During the 18 month period from the filing of the permit to the signing of the 
negotiated settlement, the level of distrust among the parties remained high and volatile. 
However, after the signing of the agreement, Alliance principals reluctantly accepted the 
level of perceived risk and provisional trust that had evolved through months of conflict 
and negotiations (The Yale Law School, 2013). Should an incident arise that requires re-
negotiations, it is likely trust will have to be re-established between the parties before a 
successful agreement can be reached again (Kunreuther, Slovic, & MacGregor, 1996). 
As of April 2013, negotiations have not re-opened among the parties. 
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7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This case study examined the effect of three intervening variables on the 
amplification and attenuation of perceived risk within a model based on the Social 
Amplification of Risk Framework. SARF is an interdisciplinary model developed by 
Kasperson et al. (1988) used to explain the subjective amplification or attenuation of risk 
perception. Risk in this context was considered to be the fear and uncertainty associated 
with something that is considered to be a threat; a threat was defined as something that 
may lead to an undesired consequence. Inherent in risk perception is the belief there are 
options and choices that may minimize or increase losses associated with that 
consequence. These options and choices are derived from risk information that 
individuals, institutions, and groups process through filters and then respond to 
rationally, minimizing the perceived risk as much as possible.  
The application for a permit by WMARSS to discharge wastewater from a 
proposed sewage treatment plant created a threat to the community where the proposed 
plant was to be located. This risk event was defined as the independent variable. Three 
filters (resources, trust, and risk communication) were identified and categorized as the 
significant intervening variables affecting the responses of the stakeholders. A dynamic 
process affected by these three variables led to a policy outcome that minimized the total 
perceived risk for all stakeholders to an acceptable level. Opposition stakeholders were 
able to negotiate changes in the plant design, protection of public water supply lines, 
future construction of a public park on the site and monies for monitoring and debt 
service as well as other considerations (see Appendix G). WMARSS was satisfied with 
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the guarantee that no legal action opposing the plant would be taken until after the plant 
was operational and the general membership of the Alliance was relieved to return their 
normal lives. With the conflict resolved,TCEQ issued the permit to discharge wastewater 
(the dependent variable). 
It is important to consider the influence perceived risk plays in the development 
and implementation of public water policy as it is a variable. However, because it is 
difficult to quantify, complex, and dynamic, public officials, and institutions may fail to 
fully consider its importance. In this case, the failure of the Waco Metropolitan Area 
Regional Sewer System to consider risk perception in their planning proved to be a 
costly mistake. Had they considered addressing and mitigating the potential, negative 
perceived risks, and concerns, of the Bull Hide community, the process may not have 
been as contentious or expensive. As it has frequently been observed, “perception is 
reality” and people respond to their perceived risks. 
Woodrow Wilson wrote over a hundred years ago, “Public administrators, at 
least in theory, are responsible for conducting the public’s business, acting in the 
public’s interest, and conscientiously balancing formal agreements with the wisdom to 
do the right thing.” Urban and regional planners have an additional responsibility-to 
responsibly balance the needs of those who are affected by policy decisions. They can 
only accomplish this objective through diligent inquiry based on moral integrity, 
democratic principles, and a sincere desire to consider the needs of private individuals as 
they strive to provide for public needs. Without exception, every project will have an 
element of perceived risk associated with it. Those planners and public officials who can 
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recognize, comprehend and successfully accommodate the perceived risk inherent in 
policy conflicts will be able to resolve and implement efficient, effective public policy 
among stakeholders. 
 
 
“It’s not what you look at that matters, it’s what you see.”  
Henry David Thoreau 
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APPENDIX A  
 
LOCATION OF MCLENNAN COUNTY IN TEXAS 
 
(UNITED STATES CENSUS, 2013) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
LOCATION OF BULL HIDE CREEK IN MCLENNAN COUNTY  
(GANDESBERY & KULTGEN, 2011)  
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APPENDIX C 
LOCATION OF WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT ON BULL HIDE CREEK 
(WMARSS, 2013) 
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APPENDIX D 
BULL HIDE CREEK WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT, 2011 
(WMARSS, 2013) 
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APPENDIX E 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS OF MCLENNAN COUNTY 
 
(Texas State Comptroller, 2002; United States Census Bureau, 2012) 
 
 
 
Population 2000 2010 
McLennan County   213,517 234,906 
Population Density Per Square Mile 205 226.5 
Ethnicity      
Percent White  72.17% 69.80% 
Percent Hispanic 17.91% 23.60% 
Percent African American  15.19% 14.80% 
Percent American Indian and Alaska Native  0.49% 0.60% 
Percent Asian  2.00% 1.40% 
Percent Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander  0.05% 0.00% 
Other 9.21% 13.40% 
Age     
18 and under 26.60% 25.40% 
20-24 9.70% 9.89% 
25-64 46.00% 47.86% 
65 and Older 12.90% 12.50% 
85 and Older 1.70% 1.80% 
Median Age 31.9 32.7 
Income     
Per Capita Income - Texas Comptroller $22,878.00 $20,652  
Household $78859 $82,998  
Median Household Income  $33,560.00 $39,620  
Median income for males $30,906.00 $34,568  
Median income for females $21,978.00 $27,680  
Percent of Population in Poverty 17.60% 21.30% 
Percent of Population under 18 in Poverty 20.70% 29.40% 
Unemployment Rate  4.20% 7.40% 
County Finances      
Total County Tax Rate   $0.4407 $0.4643  
Total Market Value $6,889,188,625  $14,215,702,244  
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APPENDIX F 
 
PROJECTED GROWTH OF HEWITT, LORENA AND WACO 
 
HDR 2011 Brazos G Regional Water Plan (HDR, 2010a, p. 2.7) 
 
 
 
 Hewitt Lorena Waco 
1990 8,983 1,158 103,590 
2000 11,085 1,433 113,726 
2010 12,667 1,640 121,355 
2020 14,262 1,849 129,046 
2030 15,606 2,025 135,528 
2040 16,999 2,207 142,247 
2050 17,884 2,323 146,514 
2060 19,170 2,491 152,715 
    
pct. Growth 0.92% 0.93% 0.94% 
 
My calculations resulted in different predicted growth percentages for the 70 year 
period. 
 
Hewitt: 113.40% 
 
Lorena: 115.11% 
 
Waco:     47.42% 
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APPENDIX G 
 
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT 
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The copy of the settlement agreement sent to me under the Texas Public Information Act 
is above. It did not show a signature or date. 
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APPENDIX H  
 
ENGINEER’S REPORT ON PLANT PROBLEMS, APRIL 2012 
 
BULL HIDE CREEK WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT CHALLENGES AND 
STARTUP OF THE STATE’S NEWEST PLANT WITH PHOSPHORUS LIMITS 
Paul Wood P.E., Sarah M. Berkey P.E., Meredith G. McCullough P.E., Michael Jupe 
Lockwood, Andrews & Newnam, Inc. 
2925 Briarpark Drive, Suite 400 
Houston, TX 77042 
 
OVERVIEW 
 
The Bull Hide Creek Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP) is located in Lorena, Texas, 
and is owned and operated by the Waco Metropolitan Area Regional Sewer System 
(WMARSS), a joint wastewater treatment effort established by the Cities of Bellmead, 
Hewitt, Lacy Lakeview, Lorena, Robinson, Waco, and Woodway. By sharing 
centralized service facilities among its member cities, WMARSS has helped to reduce 
the potential environmental impacts associated with the development of multiple 
wastewater treatment plants, each dedicated to a single entity. 
 
Further, its regionalization efforts have contributed to the protection and preservation of 
numerous natural resources. Finally, the planning and development of regional facilities 
has resulted in a reduction in the costs associated with wastewater collection, treatment 
and disposal, which has assisted the WMARSS member entities in maintaining 
affordable rates for their customers. 
 
As the newest addition of the WMARSS system, the Bull Hide Creek WWTP began 
operation in February of 2012. The facility serves the cities of Lorena and Hewitt and 
allows a portion of the load previously treated at the WMARSS Central WWTP, as well 
as the City of Lorena’s existing WWTP (which is being decommissioned), to be 
offloaded. The facility was designed to treat an average daily flow rate of 1.5 million 
gallons per day (MGD) and a peak two-hour flow rate of 
4,167 gallons per minute (GPM). 
 
The plant’s current Texas Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (TPDES) effluent 
discharge permit, issued by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), 
contains a daily average phosphorus limit of 1.0 mg/l and CBOD/TSS/NH3N limits of 
7/15/3 mg/l, respectively. The plant is designed to obtain the stipulated phosphorus 
limits biologically, with chemical backup. 
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Several challenges were encountered during plant startup, and in the early stages of 
facility operation. One of these difficulties involved identifying and transporting 
sufficient quantities of water suitable for equipment and systems testing. Another 
concern stemmed from the actual flows initially received at the plant, which equated to 
approximately eight (8) percent of the assumed 1.5 MGD design flow, as compared to 
the one-third originally estimated during design. This drastic reduction in flows 
impacted the number of units required to be on-line to facilitate actual treatment, as well 
as the schedule for performance testing of the entire plant. 
 
Another challenge associated with the plant’s startup was the overall fine-tuning of the 
treatment process to achieve full compliance with the mandated TCEQ discharge permit 
requirements. Finally, the facility’s unique sludge processing concept necessitated the 
implementation of an iterative procedure during startup to confirm sludge concentration 
and transport capability. Ultimately, the aforementioned factors, in conjunction with the 
initial phosphorus treatment results and their comparison to predicted performance 
proved to be of particular interest. 
 
KEYWORDS 
 
Wastewater, Phosphorus, Startup 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Lockwood, Andrews & Newnam, Inc., (LAN) was originally retained by WMARSS to 
lead a master planning effort for the entity’s wastewater systems. Wastewater planning 
needs were predicated using the service area limits of the existing system, in conjunction 
with the projected growth of the member cities. Chief among its findings, the master 
plan recommended that a portion of the system flow be offloaded, and subsequently 
treated at a new satellite wastewater treatment facility, in order to adequately service 
anticipated future growth. 
 
Several locations for the satellite plant were considered as part of the master planning 
process. Ultimately, a location at the south end of the system near Bull Hide Creek was 
decided upon, as it allowed the most southern portions of the system (Lorena and a part 
of Hewitt) to be served. The location of the proposed facility proved to be somewhat 
contentious. This was clearly demonstrated by its formally protested permit, and the 
lengthy litigation process that followed. 
 
The permit for the proposed Bull Hide Creek WWTP was ultimately issued by the 
TCEQ; however, several concessions were made by WMARSS to alleviate the concerns 
expressed by the protestants during the permitting process. These included: 
 
• Elimination of onsite sludge processing 
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• Inclusion of a bonus feature (pond area, similar to a wetlands, following the plant 
discharge location, but not part of the treatment train) 
• Provisions to treat phosphorus to 1 mg/l concentration levels (despite the fact that 
modeling by TCEQ indicated that phosphorus discharge at normal effluent limits was 
not a concern in the receiving waters) 
 
In addition, the plant was designed to be instrumented to a fairly high level, allowing for 
remote monitoring and control from the existing Central WWTP, as it was the desire of 
WMARSS that the facility be manned at a minimal level, requiring infrequent operator 
attention. 
  
PLANT STARTUP 
 
A number of challenges were encountered during the startup of the proposed Bull Hide 
Creek WWTP, the first of which was identifying a sufficient source of water for use in 
equipment testing. As a grass roots facility, the plant did not have a supply of treated 
effluent available for the contractor’s use in filling basins and conducting operational 
testing. Moreover, the plant’s potable water service is supplied by a local water system 
provider known as the Levi Water Supply Corporation, whose small size meant that it 
did not have sufficient capacity to supply the quantity of water needed to facilitate 
startup testing. 
 
A connection to another water supply system owned by the City of Waco was also 
considered; however, this service stopped approximately a mile away from the plant, 
making it uneconomical. Ultimately, a small existing well located on the new plant 
property was used to fill the basins over an extended period of time. By recycling the 
well water, the general contractor was able to conduct all equipment tests required to 
demonstrate mechanical operation and enable operator training. 
 
Another impact to plant startup operations arose from the physical transport of 
wastewater flows from the cities of Lorena and Hewitt to the new facility. In particular, 
two sanitary sewer interceptor projects, each slated to accomplish the conveyance of 
flow from Lorena and Hewitt, respectively, were being completed by separate general 
contractors in parallel with plant construction. 
 
The original timing of the interceptor projects was supposed to allow for their 
completion prior to that of the plant; however, delays to both ultimately resulted in the 
plant being competed first. The Lorena interceptor was completed first, with the Hewitt 
interceptor following by approximately six weeks. This resulted in a very low initial 
flow to the plant during its startup phase. 
 
The contract documents for the treatment plant project required a continuous 14 day 
performance test of the facility, in order to ascertain its ability to comply with the 
provisions specified in its TPDES effluent discharge permit. To accomplish this 
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requirement with only the initial flow provided by the Lorena interceptor, adjustments to 
the expected plant startup operations became necessary. 
 
Specifically, the existing Lorena plant was drained by pumping flow directly from the 
facility’s secondary clarifier to the new interceptor line through a newly constructed 
onsite lift station, which was completed in conjunction with the interceptor project. Flow 
to the Lorena plant was approximately 120,000 GPD during this period. Based on the 
installed lift station capacity, it was estimated that the entire Lorena plant volume and 
incoming flow could be transferred by continuous pumping within two to three hours. 
  
The available flow from Lorena proved to be quite a challenge, considering that the total 
combined volume of the new wastewater treatment plant’s biological nutrient removal 
(BNR) basins is approximately 1.13 million gallons (divided between two process 
trains). Moreover, each secondary clarifier has a volume of approximately 405,000 
gallons, and the facility’s tertiary disc filters and ultraviolet light (UV) disinfection 
system also have basins necessitating flow. 
 
Ultimately, based on the available flow and required basin volumes, it was determined 
that it would take more than a week to fill the required process units of a single treatment 
train with wastewater flows coming only from Lorena. Therefore, it was decided that 
plant startup would be undertaken with the basins still full of the well water used by the 
contractor for equipment testing and training. 
 
Running a single train reduces the plant’s capacity by half, or to 0.75 MGD; however, 
the startup flow (and thus the facility loading) was only 16 percent of that capacity, 
which is extremely low. To maintain a treatment regime that was somewhat workable, 
wasting was carefully controlled, 
in order to sustain a reasonable food to mass (F/M) ratio within the treatment process, 
and to maximize phosphorus removal. Despite these measures, the low influent load 
resulted in the production of very thin mixed-liquor sludge. 
 
In addition, the low flow within the process meant that the water was moving extremely 
slowly though the operational treatment train. This generated concerns that there might 
be issues with algae growth in the anoxic basins, secondary clarifiers, and disc filter 
basins where the water would be fairly quiescent. Provisions for alternate internal 
recycle points were implemented by partially opening plant drains to return flow to the 
onsite lift station, to allow the plant operators to keep the water within the plant 
circulating. 
 
BioWin 3.1 process modeling conducted in advance of plant startup to simulate the 
modified influent flow conditions, indicated that some phosphorus removal could be 
achieved within the biological process, despite the non-ideal regime; however, the model 
results also implied that the mandated discharge limits for phosphorus could not be 
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achieved by biological treatment alone. Fortunately, an alum system was also provided 
as a chemical backup to the biological process for phosphorus removal. 
 
In addition to controlling phosphorus, the use of the alum system also aided the 
clarification process. Further, the tertiary filtration system facilitated effluent solids 
removal and compliance with established discharge permit limits. As only one treatment 
train could be run at a time due to the low initial flow, two sequential 14 day 
performance testing periods, one for each train, were required to fully comply with the 
contract terms. 
 
Wastewater flows from Hewitt began treatment at the Bull Hide Creek WWTP 
approximately six weeks after those from Lorena. The entity’s initial flow was 
approximately 310,000 GPD. However, as smaller lift stations in the southern part of 
city are taken offline, and their flow diverted to the new Hewitt lift station, which 
transports flow via the new interceptor to the plant, the municipality’s total flow 
contribution is estimated to increase to 660,000 GPD by the 
summer of 2012. This will bring the total plant flow up to approximately 0.78 MGD. 
  
PROCESS MODELING 
 
A limited analysis of influent constituents was conducted in conjunction with the 
proposed Bull 
Hide Creek WWTP design. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 1 that 
follows. 
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Table 1 – Bull Hide Creek WWTP Influent Data 
 
 
Sample Location 
 
BOD5 
(mg/l) 
 
TSS 
(mg/l) 
 
NH3-
N 
(mg/l) 
 
TKN 
(mg/l) 
 
Total 
P 
(mg/l) 
 
O&G 
(mg/l) 
Lorena Bar Screen 235 204 22.1 35.1 8.22 40.2 
Lorena Bar Screen 207 212 43.5 61.0 10.11 36.1 
Lorena Bar Screen 225 170 33.1 58.0 7.50 36.8 
Hewitt Lift 
Station 
204 220 23.7 35.0 5.51 37.3 
Hewitt Lift 
Station 
178 72 22.5 36.5 5.93 18.7 
Hewitt Lift 
Station 
153 92 27.1 38.6 6.06 31.6 
 
 
Table 1 Legend: 
 
• BOD5  = Five-Day Biochemical Oxygen Demand 
• TSS = Total Suspended Solids 
• NH3-N = Ammonia Nitrogen 
• TKN = Total Kjeldahl Nitrogen 
• Total P = Total Phosphorus 
• O&G = Oil and Grease 
• mg/l = Milligrams per Liter (concentration of a particular wastewater 
characteristic) 
 
It is notable that previous influent BOD testing for Lorena had indicated abnormally 
high results. Based on this information, it was originally thought that there may have 
been an issue with unauthorized dumping within the sewer system; however, subsequent 
investigations by the city determined that the method in which grab sampling was being 
conducted was having a 
significant impact on the analytical results. 
 
With the aforementioned Lorena BOD loading issue clarified, reasonably conservative 
values were selected, using the data from Table 1 as a guide, as the influent 
concentration characteristics for the proposed Bull Hide Creek WWTP. These values 
were as follows: 
 
• Five-Day Carbonaceous Biochemical Oxygen Demand (CBOD5) = 250 mg/L 
• TSS = 250 mg/L 
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• Volatile Suspended Solids (VSS) = 195 mg/L 
• TKN = 40 mg/L 
• Total P = 12 mg/L 
  
 
Using these influent parameters, as well as basin sizing information derived using the 
TCEQ’s prevailing Chapter 217 wastewater treatment plant design criterion, a BioWin 
3.1 process model was constructed for the proposed facility. The model was 
subsequently used to analyze the plant’s anticipated performance under varying flow and 
loading conditions. 
 
In particular, a sensitivity analysis was performed wherein flow, clarifier underflow to 
overflow ratio, internal recycle, wasting rate, and temperature were all varied, in order to 
assess the plant’s ability to perform under different circumstances. In addition, this 
analysis provided insight with regard to the optimal conditions for plant performance. 
 
In addition to the influent characteristics discussed in the previous paragraphs, 
consideration was also given to the assumed kinetic values to be incorporated into the 
model. As the proposed Bull Hide Creek WWTP is a grass roots facility, and neither the 
existing WMARSS Central WWTP nor the Lorena WWTP, which could have been used 
as a source for seed bacteria, operates as a BNR facility, it was determined that the 
standard default kinetic values supplied with the BioWin package should be utilized 
when running the various model simulations. 
 
While it is understood that good predictions of actual effluent concentrations cannot be 
expected without thorough and iterative fine-tuning of the model, this was not the 
intention of the sensitivity analysis. Its purpose was to establish a relative level of 
comfort that the proposed treatment facility could reliably achieve nutrient removal to a 
degree that would comply with the removal goals stipulated by TCEQ. 
 
An additional point of note is that only steady state models were run when conducting 
the previously described sensitivity analysis. The basis for this decision again stemmed 
from the overall goal of the modeling effort, which was not to predict the precise quality 
of the plant’s effluent, but rather its general ability to achieve consistent permit 
compliance. 
 
Realistically, precise effluent quality results cannot be achieved without the existence of 
actual influent data for the facility. In the case of the proposed Bull Hide Creek WWTP, 
there was no profile available that documented how the influent constituents varied with 
time, nor was there adequate data demonstrating how the flow would vary with time. 
The viability of a dynamic model constructed based on such limited data would 
essentially be null. 
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With this in mind, an excerpt of the sensitivity analysis results performed in conjunction 
with the proposed Bull Hide Creek WWTP design are provided in Table 2 that follows. 
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Table 2 – Summary of Bull Hide Creek WWTP BioWin Process Model Results 
 
 
 
Model 
Name 
 
QInf. 
(MGD) 
 
Qo
/ 
Qu 
 
Qr 
(MGD) 
 
Temp. 
(°C) 
 
SRT 
(day) 
Basin 
MLSS 
(mg/l) 
RAS 
MLSS 
(mg/l) 
WAS 
TSS 
(lb/d) 
BOD 
Eff. 
(mg/l) 
TSS 
Eff. 
(mg/l
) 
Phos. 
Eff. 
(mg/l) 
NH3 
Eff. 
(mg/l) 
BH 6 0.75 0.40 1.50 15 5.58 3141 10985 1407 1.02 0.3 0.38 0.55 
BH 7 0.75 0.50 1.50 15 5.24 2940 8811 1403 1.00 0.3 0.41 0.28 
BH 8 0.75 0.60 1.50 15 4.93 2794 7445 1416 1.02 0.3 0.36 0.32 
BH 9 0.75 0.75 1.50 15 4.55 2605 6074 1433 1.05 0.3 0.30 0.41 
BH 10 0.75 1.00 1.50 15 4.03 2350 4696 1459 1.10 0.3 0.18 0.60 
BH 11 0.75 0.40 1.50 30 5.57 2963 10363 1327 0.79 0.3 0.20 0.03 
BH 12 0.75 0.50 1.50 30 5.23 2801 8395 1337 0.81 0.3 0.19 0.03 
BH 13 0.75 0.60 1.50 30 4.93 2658 7081 1346 0.82 0.3 0.19 0.03 
BH 14 0.75 0.75 1.50 30 4.54 2472 5764 1360 0.84 0.3 0.19 0.03 
BH 15 0.75 1.00 1.50 30 4.03 2223 4442 1380 0.87 0.3 0.19 0.03 
BH 16 0.75 0.60 0.75 15 4.92 2801 7463 1419 0.94 0.3 0.11 0.27 
BH 17 0.75 0.60 1.50 15 4.93 2794 7745 1416 1.02 0.3 0.36 0.32 
BH 18 0.75 0.60 2.25 15 4.94 2786 7423 1412 1.08 0.3 0.67 0.37 
BH 19 0.75 0.60 3.00 15 4.94 2785 7421 1411 1.12 0.3 0.72 0.41 
BH 20 0.75 0.60 0.75 30 4.91 2671 7115 1353 0.77 0.3 0.07 0.03 
BH 21 0.75 0.60 3.00 30 4.94 2648 7054 1341 0.92 0.3 0.50 0.03 
BH 22 0.75 0.60 0.75 15 7.95 4216 11236 1325 0.85 0.3 0.26 0.11 
BH 23 0.75 0.60 0.75 15 10.37 5286 14089 1274 0.81 0.3 0.59 0.09 
BH 24 0.75 0.60 0.75 15 32.11 6960 14652 542 33.44 123.3 8.36 0.10 
BH 25 0.75 0.60 0.75 15 11.24 5654 15070 1258 0.80 0.3 0.79 0.08 
BH 26 0.75 0.60 0.75 15 11.25 4796 12784 1067 0.81 0.3 1.82 0.08 
BH 27 0.75 0.60 0.75 15 7.95 3635 9687 1142 0.85 0.3 0.69 0.11 
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Table 2 Legend: 
 
• BH = Bull Hide 
• QInf. = Influent Flow 
• Qo = Clarifier Overflow 
• Qu = Clarifier Underflow 
• Qr = Internal Recycle Flow 
• Temp. = Temperature 
• SRT = Solids Retention Time 
• Basin MLSS = Mixed Liquor Suspended Solids Concentration from BNR 
• RAS MLSS = Mixed Liquor Suspended Solids Concentration in Return 
Activated Sludge 
• WAS TSS = Total Suspended Solids Concentration in Waste Activated Sludge 
• BOD Eff. = Biochemical Oxygen Demand Concentration in Effluent 
• TSS Eff. = Total Suspended Solids Concentration in Effluent 
• Phos. Eff. = Total Phosphorus Concentration in Effluent 
• NH3  Eff. = Total Ammonia Nitrogen Concentration in Effluent 
 
As demonstrated by the results of model runs BH 6 through BH 10, as compared to runs 
BH 11 through BH 15, increased temperature within the BNR basin (15°C versus 30°C) 
resulted in better phosphorus removal, as would be expected. Furthermore, the impacts 
of the clarifier overflow to underflow ratio largely become negligible, in terms of the 
phosphorus effluent concentration, at the higher 30°C temperature, when all other 
variables are held constant. 
 
The effects of internal recycle, with regard to phosphorus concentration were also 
studied. It was determined that a moderate internal recycle (75% of the influent flow 
rate) produced a minimum effluent phosphorus concentration. Wasting was then varied, 
as illustrated by the resulting SRT values, and as expected a higher wasting rate (shorter 
SRT) resulted in lower phosphorus effluent concentrations. 
 
SLUDGE PROCESSING 
 
As no sludge processing is allowed to take place at the Bull Hide Creek WWTP, based 
on the stipulations of its discharge permit, all sludge is hauled to the existing WMARSS 
Central WWTP for treatment. To reduce the costs associated with its transportation, 
sludge is concentrated using a rotary drum thickener (RDT) prior to hauling. 
 
There were several issues considered when developing and implementing the liquid 
hauling scheme for the proposed plant. These included: 
 
• Provisions for consistent wasting with sludge thickening system 
• Provisions for temporary thickened sludge storage 
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• Provisions for alternative sludge hauling method 
• Recognition of potential odor generation 
• Recognition of limited solids concentration to which sludge may be thickened 
  
As demonstrated by the model, a key requirement for a BNR system designed to 
accomplish phosphorus removal is consistent solids wasting. The basic function of a 
biological phosphorus removal system is to accumulate phosphorus in the sludge and 
remove it along with the wasted sludge stream. Holding the sludge longer than necessary 
will result in a re-release of the phosphorus into the liquid phase; therefore, provisions 
for consistent wasting must be provided. 
 
To address this wasting issue, the design called for waste activated sludge from the 
secondary clarifiers to be discharged to a flocculation tank prior to the thickener, within 
which it is conditioned with polymer. Sludge then enters the thickener where the free 
water is separated from the flocculated sludge. Sludge is subsequently discharged to a 
large vertical tube which serves as a pump take point. 
 
Sludge is then pumped by a double disc pump, and directed to one of three roll-off 
vacuum containers for temporary storage, prior to its transfer to a WMARSS vacuum 
truck for transport to the existing Central WWTP for processing. The use of roll-off 
vacuum containers was elected as a cost savings measure, in lieu of concrete storage 
tanks. 
 
The use of the roll-off containers also provides an alternative means of sludge hauling. 
Under this emergency transportation method, an empty roll-off container could be 
loaded onto a truck designed for handling roll-off containers, and subsequently used to 
transport liquid sludge offsite for further processing. 
 
The contents of the roll-off containers will not be aerated, though their contents could be 
re- circulated using the double disc pumps; therefore odor generation was a concern. To 
remedy this potentially negative situation, an odor control system was provided to allow 
air to be swept through the headspace of the containers. Vent piping was dry fit to allow 
for its removal and reinstallation should the containers be required for use as sludge 
transport containers. 
 
The startup of the facility’s sludge thickening operations will require numerous trial and 
error attempts to establish an optimum polymer addition rate. Of particular concern are 
the extremely thin mixed liquor solids anticipated during the plant’s initial low flow 
operational regime. Ultimately, the optimal polymer addition rate must facilitate sludge 
thickening, while still producing a product that will flow by gravity (or with some 
pumping assistance); such that it may be transferred from the roll-off containers to the 
WMARSS vacuum truck. 
 
 114 
 
 
It is widely acknowledged that there is a threshold above which thickened biological 
solids will not easily flow due to a change in their fluid properties. Generally, the fluid 
properties of a thickened sludge are most often characterized as being a pseudoplastic - 
thixotropic plastic. Pseudoplasticity is defined as the point at which the fluid's resistance 
to flow decreases with an increasing rate of shear stress, while thixotropicity is the point 
at which a fluid’s viscosity changes over time at a constant shear rate. 
  
In an attempt to visually establish these limits and how they relate to sludge 
concentration, limited testing was performed during the project design phase. In 
particular, existing dissolved air floatation (DAF) thickened sludge from the WMARSS 
Central WWTP was used to confirm the concentration at which the thickened sludge 
would actually flow out of the vacuum truck. Ultimately, the desired concentration for 
the thickened sludge was determined to be six percent. 
 
While solids concentration is known to be an important component in determining the 
rheology of thickened sludges, other factors, such as high concentrations of filamentous 
bacteria, can also have important impacts. All such variables must be considered by 
when establishing the exact thickened sludge concentration that can reliably and cost-
effectively be obtained.  Moreover, it is likely that such optimization will not be fully 
realized until the plant reaches steady state operations. 
 
RESULTS 
 
As the Bull Hide Creek WWTP is just entering into its startup operations as this paper is 
being submitted, extensive operational data is not available for inclusion in this report 
document. However, all data accumulated prior to the date of the April 2012 conference 
presentation will be reported, and made available upon request. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
